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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Arbitration Revolution

Arbitration is sweeping the American legal landscape. Simply stated, arbitration is
everywhere. Almost every American business and individual with legal capacity to
contract has entered into an agreement that specifies arbitration as the forum for resolving
most or all disputes that might arise between the parties. The importance of arbitration as
the preferred mode of dispute resolution has grown dramatically during the last ten to
twenty years, and this trend has not yet run its course. Since 1983, the leader in promoting
the enforcement of arbitration terms has been the United States Supreme Court.1 This
favorable legal environment has prompted organizations to dramatically expand the use of
arbitration provisions for contracts with both individuals and other firms.
A few examples of contexts in which arbitration is commonly used should suffice to
prove its importance in the domestic economy. [Arbitration has long been the norm for
multinational transactions, because businesses do not relish the prospect of litigation in the
courts of another country.2] At the most sophisticated end of the business spectrum,
reinsurance contracts between insurance companies mandate arbitration, as do maritime
bills of lading. Numerous trade associations have long mandated arbitration of all disputes
among members.3 Collective bargaining agreements have called for arbitration of
grievances at least since World War II, and now many contracts with individual employees
do aw well. Franchise agreements call for arbitration, at least where favorable to the
franchisor. Sellers of computers and many other consumer products require arbitration.
Contracts between securities brokers and their customers all mandate arbitration. Most
proprietary schools provide for arbitration of disputes in their enrollment contracts. The
contracts of banks, providers of medical services, and attorneys frequently specify
arbitration for the resolution of disputes. Even contest rules at McDonald’s call for
arbitration.
Another reflection of the importance of arbitration is the vast amount of litigation it
has generated, a rather ironic standard since a central purpose of arbitration is to avoid
the courts. According to Professor Charles Knapp, author of a leading contracts casebook,
“far and away” the single most litigated contract-related issue is whether to enforce a
written arbitration term in an apparently binding arbitration agreement. “And, the
court’s answer usually is yes.”4
For some years, in speeches and continuing legal education presentations, I have
been asserting that the federal courts of appeals are writing about 100 arbitration decisions
per year.5 While believing this number to be accurate I did upon occasion worry that 100
might be too high, but consoled myself with the “about” limitation. In preparation for
writing an article about recent arbitration decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit, I was forced to actually count cases.6 Between June 1, 2002 and May 30, 2003 the
Fifth Circuit produced written opinions in twenty-three (23) arbitration cases. Every one
of these is a full decision on the merits; the count does not include cases that only make
incidental mention of arbitration, petitions for rehearing, and other tangential matters.
Clearly, my assertion of 100 court of appeals arbitration decisions per annum is low rather
than high.
The highest court in the land has decided more than thirty arbitration cases since
1983, including ten since the turn of the century. The Supreme Court handed down four
arbitration decisions during the 2002-2003 Term alone.7 These caseload numbers bespeak
considerable disputation about arbitration, as well as the central importance of arbitration
as an ever more important form of binding dispute resolution.8

B. Arbitration And The Contracts Casebooks

The arbitration revolution, which is a creature of contract, has produced dramatic
changes in the resolution of disputes, but these developments are not reflected in most of
the contracts courses or casebooks. Furthermore, arbitration is quite incidental to the
topic under which it is most commonly found in the casebooks: the battle of the forms, and
related questions about what proposed terms became part of a contract.
What is the explanation for this disconnect between current contracting practices
and the casebooks? Inertia and tradition provide the most likely explanation. Integration
of a new topic into the structure of an existing casebook is a difficult and time-consuming
proposition. To a certain extent, this approach is not fully satisfactory, because it can be
seen as restating the conclusion rather than truly providing an explanation.
Lag time might provide an explanation, but in most instances the casebooks have
been updated recently so time lag is not the answer. The most recent editions of the
Farnsworth, Knapp, and Murphy casebooks provide more than passing attention to
arbitration, and the Macauley and Macneil casebooks have done so for years. The original
edition of the Fuller casebook included more extensive coverage of arbitration than the
current edition.9
Perhaps, most casebook authors do not regard arbitration as sufficiently important
to warrant substantial attention, or fail to provide such coverage because arbitration does
not fit conveniently into the doctrinal framework of contract law. Some authors may
respond that they cover arbitration through the comprehensive method, considering it as
and when arbitration arises in contract cases. Indeed, to the extent that arbitration is
considered, that is the approach taken by nearly all the casebooks, whatever the level of
arbitration coverage. The defects of this approach are discussed in the final part of the
article.

Arbitration might be considered to be a structural misfit for the course in contracts.
Arbitration law is grounded in statutes at both the state and federal level, albeit short and
general statutes that leave many matters open to judicial interpretation. Contracts
traditionally has been a common law, case-based, state law course. Many contracts courses
and casebooks do not even give serious attention to the UCC, so it is an easy step to ignore a
statutory topic such as arbitration. [In my judgment, the first year of law school
dramatically overemphasizes case law and underemphasizes statutes, but that is a topic for
another day.] Contract law is fundamentally state law, while arbitration is largely
governed by a federal statute, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).10 The most important
arbitration cases come from the U.S. Supreme Court, but the highest court in the land has
little place in basic contract law and contracts casebooks.
Arbitration might be regarded as unsuitable for use in teaching contracts because
there is not a conventional body of law to teach about. Professor Knapp characterizes
arbitration as “not ... the kind of findable, studiable, arguable, appealable, Restateable
kind of law that has characterized the Contract area for over a century.”11 Perhaps the
best evidence of the teachable importance of arbitration is provided by the remainder of
the article from which this quotation is taken. That arbitration can and should be taught is
evidenced by the 2003 edition of the Knapp casebook (but not the earlier editions).
It is conceivable, but extremely unlikely, that some contracts casebook authors are
simply unaware of the arbitration revolution that has taken place over the last twenty
years. Since arbitration proceedings take place outside the courts, and typically do not
generate written opinions (outside the labor context), these developments might “pass
below the radar” of scholars, particularly because they learned little if anything about
arbitration in law school.0 However, the radical expansion in the use of arbitration has
been accompanied by a huge amount of arbitration litigation and reported cases, as well as
a large body of law review literature.
There is some positive evidence that the casebook authors are well aware of
developments in arbitration law. While Knapp writes of “a quiet revolution,” it is difficult
to believe that these developments have escaped the attention of contracts casebook
authors, who necessarily keep up with current developments. Two authors of contracts
casebooks, Ian Macneil and Richard Speidel, are also co-authors of the leading treatise on
arbitration law.13 Both casebooks have recently updated editions, and each devotes
considerable attention to arbitration.
Perhaps the best evidence of a disconnect between what a casebook author knows
and what is presented in the casebook is the Fuller casebook.14 Arbitration barely rates a
mention, and the Index does not list arbitration as a topic. The Source Materials
Supplement by Professors Steven Burton and Melvin Eisenberg, two of our most
distinguished contracts scholars and casebook authors, includes four important, complex,
and lengthy Sample Form Contracts.15 All are promulgated by industry organizations
rather than individual firms:

1. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, Standard
Member Teams and Baseball Players;

Contract Between

2. Writer’s Guild of America, Freelance Television Writers
Contract;

Employment

3. American Institute of Architects, Standard Form Agreement
and Contractor [AIA-A101 and AIA-A201]; and

Between Owner

4. California Association of Realtors, Residential Purchase
BIA-14, and TDS-14].

Agreement [RPA-14,

These forms are carefully crafted standardized arrangements that heave been in use for
some years, and which have been adjusted over time to reflect experience with their use.
What do these contracts say about dispute resolution? Let’s take a look.
The American League contract [the National League agreement is materially
identical] specifies that disputes are to be settled under the Grievance procedures specified
in the Basic Agreement between the two major leagues and the Major League Baseball
Players Association (MLBPA). The Basic Agreement calls for arbitration, above all, of
salary disputes under a final offer format. Indeed, this approach – where each disputant
states a final number and the arbitrator must choose one or the other – is commonly
referred to as “baseball arbitration.”
The WGA contracts provide that “any disputes” concerning the “interpretation or
application” of the agreement must be submitted for arbitration by the Guild’s arbitration
committee, pursuant to the Guild’s arbitration procedures. The determination of the
arbitration committee is “conclusive and binding upon the parties.”
The AIA has provided form construction contracts since early in the 20th century,
which are in regular use throughout America. Like AIA-A101, these contracts incorporate
by reference AIA-A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction. Article 4.5
calls for arbitration under the Construction Arbitration Rules of the AAA, of any
controversy or claim “arising out of or related to” the agreement. This is the classic broad
form arbitration language employed by the AIA and the AAA since before World War II.
Most adjudicated construction disputes are decided by arbitrators, not by judges.
[Readers of contracts casebooks, however, would conclude that adjudicated contract
dispute are heard predominantly, if not entirely, by courts.]
The California Association of Realtors (CAR) residential purchase agreement
broadly calls for arbitration of “any dispute or claim in Law or equity,” subject to listed
exceptions – foreclosure, unlawful detainer; matters within the jurisdiction of probate,
small claims, or bankruptcy courts; filing or enforcement of a mechanic’s lien; and
personal injury claims. There is a notice about arbitration in bold print, followed by a
place for the initials of the buyer(s) and seller(s). Arbitration provisions in residential real

estate contracts, as illustrated by the CAR, are in increasingly common use throughout the
country.
The dispute resolution provisions of the four important types of form contracts
selected by Professors Burton and Eisenberg have one thing in common: each calls for the
resolution of many if not all of all disputes between the parties. Clearly, contracts teachers
know about the transformation of dispute resolution through the inclusion of arbitration
provisions in agreements, but that knowledge has not yet been translated into the
casebooks and the teaching of contracts.

C. Overview Of The Article

The contract-based arbitration revolution has dramatically changed dispute
resolution in America, but (with limited exceptions) these developments are not reflected in
contracts courses or casebooks. The goal of this article is to explore what the casebooks
have to say about arbitration, and to propose some better alternatives.
This article adopts two closely related approaches. The text consists of a general
discussion about arbitration and contracts, as reflected in contracts casebooks. A detailed
examination and critique of the individual casebooks is presented in the Appendix. The
casebooks are considered in alphabetical order (based on the name of the senior author), so
the reader can easily find the discussion of a particular casebook, or review the supporting
evidence for the conclusions in the general discussion.
The article is built on a fundamental assumption, which is that the contents of the
contracts casebooks accurately reflect the substantive material covered in the universally
required first year course in contracts. There are, of course, variations from school to
school and from professor to professor, but the casebooks provide a broadly accurate
reflection of what is taught in American contracts classes.
After a review of the research methodology that produced the results reported here,
I set out my conclusions in the form of a series of assertions about arbitration and
contracts. The article will demonstrate the accuracy of each of these statements. Taken
together, these propositions constitute a clear critique of what contracts casebooks teach
about arbitration law and practice.
One goal of this project was to identify and examine the leading arbitration cases in
contracts casebooks. There turned out to be few leading cases, but they do reflect the most
important arbitration topics found in contracts casebooks: formation, unconscionabilty,
and remedial powers of arbitrators. Accordingly, the leading cases are considered within
these categories. The ensuing discussion focuses on, but is not limited to, the leading cases

and topics. Of particular importance is the conclusion that contracts teachers are generally
hostile to arbitration, at least in the context of consumer and employment transactions.16
No article about contracts would be complete without an examination of the
relevant provisions of the Second Restatement of Contracts. Only a short discussion is
required, because the Restatement has almost nothing to say about arbitration. The
critique presented in the article makes it incumbent on the author to offer some
alternatives, and that task is undertaken at the end of the article.

II. ARBITRATION IN THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM

A brief examination what is taught elsewhere in the law school curriculum
arbitration will provide helpful context for the ensuing discussion of contracts and
arbitration. The short answer is: not much. What limited exposure to arbitration does
occur is in specialized and low-enrollment courses that are not taken by most students.
None of the large enrollment (mostly bar examination) law school courses provides an
opportunity for the more than passing mention of arbitration. If it is important for law
students to receive an exposure to arbitration, it will happen in contracts or not at all.
The sweeping generalization that most law students will receive little if any exposure
to arbitration outside of the course in contracts is based on a 2001 survey of American law
schools about the teaching of arbitration by the Tulane Arbitration Institute, under the
leadership of Professor Thomas Carbonneau.17 Responses were received from 168 (of 184)
nationally accredited law schools, an overwhelming response rate. Nearly all (155) claimed
to teach arbitration as a separate course or as part of an ADR course. Of course, selfreported data must be viewed with caution, and the extent of arbitration coverage is
probably exaggerated.18
While 116 law schools teach some sort of arbitration course, only seven claim to
teach more than one. Many of these courses are specialized, with Labor Arbitration (32)
and International Arbitration (29) being be by far the most common. Only about thirty
percent the law schools teach a general arbitration course (51). The Tulane questionnaire
also asked law schools to report additional courses that included “reference to” arbitration.
The only ones that received significant mention were Labor Law (16) and International
Business Transactions (7).
Sixty-three law schools teach arbitration only as part of an ADR course. With the
dramatic growth in the use of mediation, the consideration of arbitration commonly is
modest. ADR supporters regard voluntary participation as a hallmark of ADR, so much so
that a leading scholar has suggested that arbitration should be drummed out of ADR
movement.19

Labor law is a subject in which arbitration should have a central role. After all,
virtually every collective bargaining agreement (CBA) since World War II has specified a
multi-step dispute resolution process that culminates with binding arbitration. [Of the
contracts casebooks, only Macauley and Macneil provide more than passing mention of
CBAs, and the settlement of disputes thereunder.] Instead, arbitration has less of a place
than it did in 1950.20 Arbitration was a central topic in labor law courses after World War
II, because many of the faculty were participants in the dispute resolution process during
and shortly after the War.21
Over the decades, arbitration largely disappeared from labor law courses, which
adopted the traditional law school pedagogy and content (cases and statutory analysis).
Even the rise of ADR in the 1980s had “only modest effect” on the teaching of labor law. 22
As for employment arbitration, it went unnoticed. As recently as 1994, Professor Cooper’s
labor arbitration “coursebook” devoted only one page to employment arbitration.23 The
rise of ADR in the workplace may actually decrease coverage of arbitration. The latest
edition of the leading casebook changed its title from Labor Arbitration to ADR in the
Workplace.24
Even now, dispute resolution, which includes much more than arbitration, is
accorded only “modest treatment” in employment law casebooks.25 In addition, the subject
of the law related to the workplace is being further sundered by specialty courses. Not only
are there separate course dealing with labor law and employment law, the narrower topic
of employment discrimination is the subject to two casebooks.26 Even if such specialized
courses taught a good deal about arbitration, the lessons learned will be about labor
arbitration or employment arbitration, rather than arbitration in general.
None of the courses that address arbitration are central to the law school
curriculum, and the enrollments typically are small.27 Another measure of marginality of
arbitration/ADR courses is that so many are taught by adjunct faculty (40 percent). In
sum, the vast majority of law students need to receive some exposure to arbitration in
contracts, or they will not receive it at all.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A. Review Of The Casebooks

The universe for this research was all the casebooks designed for teaching a first
year Contracts. No modern “casebook” is limited to cases, and some of the published
contracts materials range far beyond cases, but the term casebook is conventional and

convenient. This approach excludes books of readings about contracts, sets of problems,
and hornbooks. The casebooks are referred to by the name of the first author, even if that
person is deceased. Except where otherwise indicated, all references are to the latest
edition of each casebook. Earlier editions of several casebooks are discussed, particularly
those that have recently appeared in a new edition.
Although I began this undertaking with a general familiarity about the array of
contracts casebooks, having at least glanced at all of them at some time, I had not carefully
reviewed most of them. The first thing that struck me was the large number of published
contracts casebooks – no less than 23 of them.
My review of a casebook began with the preface, to learn about the goals of the
authors and changes from the prior edition. Arbitration hardly ever rated so much as a
mention, but in many casebooks there was considerable rhetoric about teaching students
how the real world of contracting works, and about being up-to-date. [Some authors focus
on contract theory and doctrine, rather than how contracts works in practice, or on recent
developments.] One might hypothesize that arbitration would be prominently featured –
anyway, somewhat featured – in the casebooks that seek to focus on current developments
and the law in action, but that clearly has not happened.
Seeking to determine the contents of law school casebooks about a particular topic is
a challenging task. Casebooks have a purpose, which is to provide material for teaching a
course; they are not designed as research tools. Thus it is not a criticism of the casebooks
to say that using them to research a particular topic is difficult.
For each casebook, I reviewed the Index and Table of Contents for references to
arbitration. In addition, I checked the Table of Cases for the names of the cases most
commonly discussed in the arbitration literature. One lesson from this exercise is that the
indexes in contracts casebooks are modest in length and scope. (The best index award goes
to the Farnsworth casebook.) What is lacking in indexes is more than made up for by the
detailed table of contents that is found in almost every contracts casebook. In addition to
chapter names and subheadings, every major case is listed by name, and other materials as
well.
All the casebooks have tables of cases; most also include tables of citations to the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the Restatement Second of Contracts
(Restatement). These proved to be of little value for this project because the UCC does not
address the subject of arbitration, and the Restatement has little to say on the topic.
It can be stated with some confidence that this review of the casebooks unearthed
every significant consideration of matters related to arbitration, and nearly all minor
references to the topic. No doubt, there are a few casual references to arbitration buried in
note material that escaped my attention. Because the resort to arbitration has become so
widespread, it might receive mention under almost any topic. An example from the Knapp
casebook (716) will illustrate the problem. In the notes after one of the cases in the
material on third party beneficiaries, note 5 is about defenses available to the promisor.

Buried in the middle of a paragraph there is a single sentence about arbitration: it states
that a person making a claim as a third party beneficiary of a contract is bound by an
arbitration provision in the contract, and cites two cases to that effect.

B. Determination Of The Leading Cases

To the extent that contracts casebooks consider arbitration, it was expected that a
small number of cases would appear with relative great frequency. This expectation was
not borne out, but it was possible to identify a few leading cases, which are discussed at
length in part IV of this article. To facilitate the process of identifying leading cases, and to
ensure objectivity, I created a simple scoring system that awarded points in the following
manner:

a.

Main Case

5 points

b.

Substantial Coverage

3 points

b.

Some Coverage

2 points

c.

Minimal Coverage

1 point

This approach requires little defense because the numbers are designed to show only than
rough orders of magnitude.
The main case designation reflects the decisions made by the casebook authors. The
only discontinuity in the scoring system is for the main cases, because they are regarded as
of particular importance by authors, teachers, and students. Law school class discussion
commonly focuses on a single case, with subsidiary material being introduced through
questions that explore the meaning of the main case. Distinctions between minimal, some,
and substantial coverage presented a few close calls, but nothing of consequence turns on
these decisions.
No case was awarded more than five points, even if it was both a main case and also
the subject of additional discussion. The most common example is the pairing of the Hill
and Klocek decision– precisely because, on materially identical facts, Klocek discusses Hill
but reaches the opposite conclusion about whether the arbitration term (and others)
became part of the contract.

IV. Research Conclusions

This section of the Article sets forth my conclusions about what is taught about
arbitration law and practice in Contracts courses, in the form of a series of assertive
statements. The evidence in support of these statements is found in the discussion of the
individual casebooks in the Appendix, and in other parts of this article. Accordingly, there
is no discussion of the research conclusions here.

1. Discussion about the law and practice of arbitration in contracts casebooks is extremely
modest, reflecting a judgment that arbitration has little if any place in the first year
contracts course.

2. The nature and extent of arbitration coverage in contracts casebooks varies widely,
ranging from absolutely none to quite substantial.

3. Most of the arbitration cases are presented in the context of a substantive contracts
topic, with the arbitration context being quite incidental.

4. There is hardly any discussion in the contracts casebooks of arbitration as a discrete
topic – one that might be worthy of separate consideration.
5. Among the arbitration cases that appear in the casebooks, there is an almost complete
lack of consensus about which ones are the leading cases.

6. To the limited extent that some leading arbitration cases can be identified in the
contracts casebooks, few if any would be considered leading cases by persons who
work in the field of arbitration.

7. Conversely, few if any of the leading arbitration cases are among those receiving
primary attention in the contracts casebooks.

8. The coverage of arbitration that does appear in contracts casebooks fails to address
some of the most important topics – above all, the allocation of authority between
courts and arbitrators.

9. The arbitration materials in contracts casebooks are full of errors, inaccuracies, and
misleading statements; in some instances, once accurate statements have been
rendered inaccurate by subsequent developments.

10. Much of the arbitration material in the contracts casebooks is out-of-date, and should
be changed to reflect more recent developments.

11. To the extent that the casebook authors have a normative view about arbitration, they
are broadly hostile to arbitration.

12. The casebooks systematically overuse lower court opinions and state rather than
federal decisions. In particular, relevant U.S. Supreme Court opinions are regularly
ignored.

13. The casebooks systematically fail to recognize the importance of federal preemption of
state law restrictions on arbitration, whether statutory or judicial in origin.
14. The casebooks have virtually nothing to say about the central role of arbitration in
contracts that involve more than one nation, and the vital importance of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New
York Convention).

IV. THE LEADING CASES

A. AND THE WINNERS ARE

To the extent that contracts casebooks consider arbitration, just a few cases are used
with even modest frequency. At one point a Top 10 list seemed in the offing, but there
turned out to be only nine arbitration cases that merit specific mention. Given that any
main case used in a single casebook was awarded five points, the fact that only nine cases
garnered even seven points demonstrates a remarkable absence of consensus. The
maximum number of points a case could receive is 115 (23 casebooks x 5 points). A simple
listing of the point scores for the leading cases is striking:

2.

Hill (1997)
2.

Garrity (1976)

3.

Klocek (2000)

42
26
25

4.

Itoh

(1977)

5.

Grayson-Robinson (1960)

6.

Brower (1997)

7.

TWA (1965)

8.

Graham (1981)

20
19
15
10
8

9.
Armendariz (2000)
7
With a single exception, the leading arbitration cases (and most of the lesser cases as
well) fit comfortably into three doctrinal categories: contract formation, unconscionability,
and remedies. The exception is a labor grievance arbitration decision (TWA), which topic
is rarely covered in contracts casebooks. The doctrinal categories will be discussed in this
order, which also reflects their importance for contracts and arbitration.
Perhaps the most striking fact about these cases, obscured by the use of only one
name to identify cases, is that a single firm was the defendant in three of them – Gateway
Computer. All three of these cases were decided since 1997.28 Only one of the other
leading cases was decided that recently.

B. Contract Formation

1. Overview
The two leading cases, and three of the top four, are found in this category: Hill,29
Klocek,30 and Itoh.31 Hill and Klocek are a matched pair of consumer cases that reach
opposite results on materially identical facts. Itoh and similar commercial cases are briefly
considered, followed by a discussion of whether an arbitration provision constitutes a
material alteration under U.C.C. sec. 2-207(2)(a). Finally, I suggest that while consumers
win the occasional battle about arbitration with a merchant, they are destined to lose the
arbitration war.
The usual rubric for the topic discussed here is “the battle of the forms.” It arises
commonly in the sale of goods, but the issue is not limited to transactions governed by the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The merits of this vexed and much discussed topic are
not considered here, apart from the arbitration context.32 The expression “contract
formation” follows conventional usage, but the central problem only rarely is whether or
not the parties have entered into a contract.33 Instead, the problem is to identify the terms
of a contract that clearly exists, because performance has already taken place (at least in
part) but the parties have not in fact concurred in the terms of their agreement.

2. Hill and Klocek
There are four leading cases regarding the terms of contracts formed through some
combination of forms, terms in the product container, telephone calls, and electronic
communication in the purchase, lease, or licensing of goods. Two are opinions by Judge
Frank Easterbrook: Zeidenberg and Hill. Zeidenberg is the earlier decision, has more
interesting facts than Hill, and is the more comprehensive opinion. Hill relies heavily on
Zeidenberg. Hill involves arbitration, while Zeidenberg does not. Most of the recently
published casebooks include one or the other, but the fact that Hill involves arbitration has
no role in the decision.
The two leading cases that reject the Easterbrook approach are Step-Saver and
Klocek. Step-Saver features an excellent opinion by Judge John Minor Wisdom, but it was
decided before the two Easterbrook opinions, and so cannot directly join issue with them.34
Klocek is the more recent decision; in it, Judge Vraitel discusses Hill at length, and rejects
its reasoning.35
Zeidenberg and Step-Saver are the more interesting opinions, and they involve more
sophisticated commercial transactions, but they already have been eclipsed by the pairing
of Hill and Klocek in the casebooks, a trend that will accelerate as new editions of
casebooks are published. Hill and Klocek both involve arbitration, while Zeidenberg and
Step-Saver do not, but the arbitration context is entirely coincidental to the contract
formation issues.
Hill and Klocek involved materially identical transactions: telephone purchases of
computers from Gateway [formerly known as Gateway 2000, when that name sounded
futuristic]. Payment was by credit card, and when the computer arrived the papers in the
box stated additional terms, including arbitration, to which the buyer was subject unless
the computer was returned in thirty days. In each instance the buyer became dissatisfied
with the purchase after the expiration of the thirty days, and filed a law suit claiming
breach of contract. Gateway sought to have the disputes submitted to arbitration in
Chicago, under South Dakota law, as provided by the papers enclosed with the computer.
Judge Easterbrook has sought to reintroduce the “last shot” doctrine into contract
law by allowing incorporation of contract terms in a “rolling contract.” This approach
strongly favors sellers, and is regarded by many as inconsistent with conventional contract
formation law. In UCC terms, Easterbrook ruled that there was only one form, so 2-207
was inapplicable. As for the contract terms, the offeror is master of the offer, and the
buyer accepted the seller’s terms by not returning the computer within 30 days. [This
return period is unusually generous, and provides a surface appeal to Easterbrook’s
decision, but the result would be the same if the return period was five days, or even in the
absence of any return period.] Since the buyer in Hill telephoned the seller, and paid for
the good prior to shipment (by authorizing a credit card charge), one might think that the
buyer rather than the seller is the offeror.

Hill conveys to students the important and accurate message that arbitration terms
in contracts are enforced as a matter of course. This message is conveyed in the most
fundamental way: it is taken for granted by Judge Easterbrook. Whether the arbitration
term became part of the contract between the parties was disputed, but once found to be
part of the contract the consequence of sending the underlying controversy to arbitration
was clear, and hardly merited discussion. Arguments based on contract defenses, including
fraud, are treated dismissively [“do not require more than a citation to Prima Paint”].
Students will not know what the reference to Prima Paint means, but that is true of many
references during the opening months of law school. As for the costs and benefits of the
use of arbitration, “which the Hills disparage,” that is a matter “for Congress and the
contracting parties to consider.” In short, if you do not like arbitration, negotiate a
different contract. Klocek focuses on the contract terms issue, and has little to say about
arbitration.

3. Itoh and Similar Cases

Itoh is one of the classic commercial battle of the forms cases, and it is used to
illustrate UCC section 2-207. Due to an “expressly made conditional” provision, the
absence of an express agreement regarding arbitration led the court to apply 2-207(3),
whereupon the contract consisted of the terms actually agreed to by the parties plus UCC
gap fillers. Since the UCC does not address arbitration, the default position is no
arbitration. This approach avoided the need to consider whether an arbitration provision
is a material alteration, the most important 2-207 arbitration issue. Some of the 2-207
standards, such as Dorton (also an arbitration case) and the much maligned Roto-Lith
decision are steadily disappearing from the contracts casebooks.36 Itoh is destined for the
same fate, perhaps being replaced by a decision based on the revised Article 2 of the UCC.

4. Material Alteration
The materiality of arbitration for purposes of 2-207(2)(b), in transactions between
merchants, is of only modest consequence for contract law generally. Accordingly, this
important arbitration topic receives little consideration in the casebooks, even those that
use arbitration cases to illustrate 2-207 issues.37
Whether an arbitration provision not actually agreed to by merchants negotiating a
deal becomes part of the contract between the party depends on whether arbitration is a
material alteration under 2-207(2)(b), and secondarily on which party has the burden of
proof on that issue. [Where agreement is “expressly made conditional” on acceptance of the
terms of a party, so no contract is formed by offer and acceptance, the teaching of Itoh is
that 2-207(3) governs, and the arbitration proposal drops out.]

Under New York law, arbitration is a material alteration, and the burden of proof is
on the proponent of arbitration, but not all courts agree.38 The New York approach has
the great merit of not giving either party an unbargained for term. As for the presumption
in favor of arbitration, that comes into effect only after there has been a determination that
the parties have agreed to arbitrate. Even so, agreement to arbitration might be based on
course of dealing or trade usage, as New York has recognized.39
The burden of proof situation is more difficult, because sec. 2-207(2) specifies that
between merchants, additional terms “become part of the contract unless ....”40
Conventional reading of this language would place the burden on the party opposing
inclusion of the additional term, but this approach rewards strategic behavior and
undermines the default position of no arbitration.
Different outcomes under identical statutory language may require a choice of law
determination prior to making the arbitration determination. This situation arose in the
Avedon case, where the choice was between New York and Colorado law (which at least
Adoption of a per se rule that arbitration is
arguably would require arbitration).41
material would short-circuit this sort of difficult, and perhaps result-oriented, inquiry.
A related issue is the need for a written agreement to arbitrate. The basis for the
writing requirement is not the Statute of Frauds, but arbitration statutes. For transactions
that are governed by the FAA “an agreement in writing” is required, while the UAA speaks
of a “written agreement.”42 Unlike the UCC, however, the FAA and UAA do not require
that the writing be signed. Even a jurisdiction that puts arbitration into an agreement
under 2-207(2)(b) might decline to order arbitration because the written agreement
requirement was not satisfied. None of the casebooks consider these differences.

5. Why Merchants Will Win the Arbitration War

The occasional consumer success in litigation with sellers of computers or other
products are more apparent than real, because merchants can nearly always adjust their
contracting practices to achieve the desired result – such as an enforceable arbitration
term. Contracting though modern technology will be harnessed by sellers to serve their
interests. The point is nicely illustrated by a recent 2d Circuit decision, Specht v.
Netscape.43 The consumer was invited to download software, with additional contract
terms (one of which called for arbitration) being found by scrolling down the electronic
“page” beyond the download icon that reflected agreement by the purchaser.
Rejecting the Easterbrook approach, the court held that terms appearing below the
place where the buyer indicated assent came too late, and thus were not part of the
contract between the parties. The buyer won on the arbitration issue in this case, but
Specht clearly shows the way to seller success in subsequent dealings with consumers.
Nothing more is required than to relocate the arbitration provision above the contracting

icon (send, order, agree, or similar name) instead of below it. This approach garnered for
Microsoft its selection of Washington State as the forum for litigating its dispute with a
New Jersey customer.44 The additional contract terms need not clutter the progress toward
a sale; all that is required is an icon that leads the interested customer to the additional
terms. Uninterested customers (i.e., most rational customers, including lawyers) can scroll
past that icon and proceed with the transaction. The practical impact of Klocek will be
similarly modest.
Only foolish merchants (or their counsel) will engage in legal analysis of the varying
approaches to contract formation. Instead, they will adjust their behavior to make their
contract terms available to customers on a web page, and so state in their advertisements,
and on the boxes that contain the product. For electronic purchases, buyers easily can be
offered the option of examining the contract terms or clicking through to make a purchase.
For telephone purchases, the customer need simply be told that the contract terms are
“available on our web page.” There is no need to read contract provisions to potential
customers – as Judge Easterbrook disingenuously suggested in Hill.45
While contract formation issues in a world of electronic commerce will continue to
be of central importance for the first year course in contracts, merchants will have little
difficulty in mandating arbitration of disputes. There will continue to be the occasional
case where a customer escapes arbitration through the application of state contract law,
but these situations will be unusual and merchants (with the advice of counsel) will
promptly and successfully adjust their contracting behavior accordingly.

C. Unconscionability

1. Overview
The leading unconscionability decisions in the casebooks are Brower,46 Graham,47
and Armendariz,48 respectively numbers six, eight, and nine among the leading cases.
Despite these weak rankings, unsconscionability is clearly the most important and most
discussed arbitration topic in contracts casebooks. The reason for the focus on
unconscionability is that this is usually the sole realistic state contract law defense available
to a person seeking to avoid arbitration. [Under the separability doctrine, other contract
law defenses will thwart arbitration only if the defense relates specifically to the making of
the arbitration provision.]49 Most of the successful unconscionability claims are decisions
from state courts. The casebooks present a variety of such decisions; no single case has
captured the attention of authors.
Apart from the lack of consensus among casebook authors about the leading
arbitration unconscionability cases, not a single one even discusses let alone reproduces
what most people who toil in the arbitration vineyard would identify as the leading
employment unconscionability decision: Hooters, Inc. v. Phillips.50 A decision from the 4th

Circuit, with the opinion written by Chief Judge Wilkerson, is a precedent that will be
taken seriously by courts that are reflexively suspicious of California innovations. The
Epstein casebook does reprint the Hooters decision, but the district court rather than the
court of appeals version.
Two of the three leading unconscionability cases, Armendariz and Graham, are
decisions by the California Supreme Court. The California courts have taken the lead in
the aggressive resort to unconscionability doctrine in general, and to thwart arbitration in
particular. Even Professor Harry Prince, coauthor of the Knapp casebook (and Knapp’s
colleague at Hastings College of Law) is critical of the widespread resort to
unconscionability by the California courts, led by the California Supreme Court. He uses
terms like “significant doubt about the soundness and consistency;” “capriciousness;” and
“disturbing, if not alarming, tendencies.”51

2. Armendariz

Armendariz is clearly the most significant of the leading unconscionabilty
cases, even though it garnered the fewest points of the three. Armendariz illustrates the
application of the unconscionability doctrine in the context of arbitration provisions in
employment contracts. More precisely, the first arbitration requirement is often found in
the job application, so that claims by persons who are not hired are also subject to
arbitration. Typically, the subsequent employment agreement also mandates arbitration of
mostor all disputes.
The relatively recent vintage of Armendariz, the importance of the court, and the
employment arbitration topic all suggest that the point system used here undervalues
Armendariz. As a decision of the California Supreme Court, it is cited in almost every
subsequent arbitration unconscionability case, but these are too recently decided to appear
in contracts casebooks. Such citations are not counted in my simple scoring system.
However, the shelf life of leading arbitration decisions can be short, and Armendariz has
already been supplanted as the leading employment arbitration case by a subsequent
California Supreme Court decision, Little v. Auto Stiegler, that includes an extensive
discussion of Armendariz.52
Armendariz offers a comprehensive tour of the anti-arbitration arguments by a
distinguished jurist, Stanley Mosk. The court held that the employment agreement was
both substantively and procedurally unconscionable, and affirmed the refusal of the trial
court to sever the unconscionable portions of the agreement. Although the court declined to
enforce the arbitration agreement, it went on to state that an agreement to arbitrate
constitutes implied consent to discovery sufficient for the employee to vindicate her claim;
the employer must pay the costs unique to arbitration; and the absence of mutuality in the
arbitration provision constitutes substantive unconscionability. Two concurring judges
questioned the breadth of the majority opinion, but there were no dissenters.

One consequence of Armendariz has been to generate considerable litigation by
employees in California. Other courts, notably the Supreme Court of Texas, have expressly
rejected the reasoning of Armendariz.53
Armendariz has been supplanted by the Little decision as the leading California
arbitration case. In Little, a four judge majority of the California Supreme Court extended
the Armendariz principles, developed in the context of statutory rights, to judicially created
“public policy” claims. The court did so despite the intervening Green Tree decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court, that requires a case-by-case analysis of arbitration costs rather than
categorically placing the costs unique to arbitration on the employer. The California
Supreme Court determined, surely incorrectly, that the FAA does not require states to
comply with federal standards regarding costs of arbitration. On the merits of the debate,
the California Supreme Court saw “no reason to reevaluate” its position in light of Green
Tree.54 Little refused to follow the approach of the D.C. Circuit, whose Cole decision was
heavily relied upon in Armendariz, that refused to extend Cole to public policy claims.55
Three judges strongly disagreed with this extension of Armendariz.
In addition, the California Supreme Court in Little unanimously held
unconscionable, and severed from the arbitration agreement, a provision that an award in
excess of $50,000 required a reasoned written opinion that either party could appeal to a
second arbitrator.56 While this provision applied equally to both parties, the reality is that it
is entirely favorable to the employer. The Little decision teaches a great deal about the law
and practice of employment arbitration, and about unconscionability as well. Little is
likely to replace Armendariz as a leading case in the contracts casebooks.
A striking aspect of the coverage of employment arbitration in contracts casebooks,
of which Armendariz is the leading example, is the assumption – without discussion or
explanation – that arbitration is a bad option for employees. This is not the place to discuss
the costs and benefits of employment arbitration, but some important benefits are worth
noting. Arbitration is quick, usually inexpensive, possible (if not prudent) without a lawyer,
and makes continuation of employment a possibility. The judicial alternative is more
apparent than real for most employees, because claims rarely are large enough to justify a
contingent fee arrangement and few terminated workers can afford to retain counsel.
Employers prevail in the vast majority of employment cases, and at best a court victory by
the employee comes years later.

None of the casebooks use Judge Harry Edwards’ excellent opinion in Cole, which in
sweeping dicta (of which Judge Henderson is sharply critical) states that employers are
welcome to insist on arbitration of statutory claims, but they may not require employees to
pay more for costs specific to arbitration (filing fees and arbitrator compensation) than they
would for court filing fees.57 After the Supreme Court ruled in 1991 that statutory
employment claims were subject to arbitration, employers adopted arbitration provisions
that called for the arbitration of all disputes.58 This development is enormously beneficial

for employees as a class, above all for lower income employees. The result is that employees
obtain a forum for disputes that would be rejected out of hand by the courts under the
employment at will doctrine. Lawyers are the only clear winners from increased
employment litigation. As the strongly pro-worker Professor Clyde Summers, put the
matter: “This is scarcely a legal remedy process but rather a redistribution device which
enriches lawyers at the expense of both employer and employee.”59

3. Graham
Graham involved a standard music industry concert contract between the once wellknown singer Leon Russell (Scissor Tail was wholly owned by Russell) and Bill Graham, a
leading concert promoter. The contract was a standard form agreement promulgated by
the American Federation of Musicians (AFM). It called for prompt and final resolution of
any disputes through arbitration, with AFM members serving as the arbitrators. [This
approach is common in trade association arbitration, with the attendant benefits of prompt,
procedurally informal, and expert decisions. The association members serving as
arbitrators typically are not compensated for their efforts.] A dispute arose, arbitration
took place, and a decision was rendered that was unsatisfactory to Graham. Russell sought
confirmation of the arbitration award, whereupon Graham raised unconscionability as a
defense.
The California Supreme Court informs us that Graham had been a party to the
AFM form agreement “literally thousands of times,” including fifteen contracts with Scissor
Tail. He also was a party to arbitration of prior disputes under the AFM form agreement.
This scenario seems to present an unlikely set of circumstances for Graham to claim that he
was taken advantage of in an unconscionable manner. Not to be deterred, the California
Supreme Court reduced this wealthy and sophisticated concert promoter to a “humble
supplicant” in this contract of adhesion.
Under the contract, the arbitrator is appointed by the AFM, and therefore was
“presumptively biased,” which made the arbitration provision unconscionable and
unenforceable. As a result, the arbitration procedure failed to meet a “minimum level of
integrity.” The case was remanded for a new arbitration before a neutral arbitrator.
Failing agreement by the parties on the selection of an arbitrator, the trial court was
instructed to appoint one under the California Arbitration Act (CAA).
Graham is a terrible decision, and certainly should not be included in contracts
casebooks. The statute considered by the Court was the CAA rather than the FAA,
although the transactions clearly involved interstate commerce. It may be responded that
this was not obvious in 1981, because the primacy of the FAA was not definitively
established by the U.S. Supreme Court until its Southland decision in 1984.60 Even if this
excuses the court’s reliance on the CAA, it does not excuse the use of Graham in contracts
casebooks today.

Arbitrators are not normally subject to removal by a court because of presumptive
bias based on occupation or affiliation with an organization. Rather, evidence of actual or
likely bias must be presented. Removal prior to an arbitration proceeding, as opposed to
after a final award, is rare. Even if the result reached by the California Supreme Court was
correct, the proper legal basis for doing so is “evident partiality” rather than
unconscionability.61
Resort to unconscionability in commercial disputes is a suspect (and unusual)
approach in general, and particularly so with respect to arbitrations agreements. In
practice, such claims succeed about as often as National League pitchers hit home runs –
rarely indeed. The prudent attorney should warn a commercial client, in writing, that an
unconscionability defense is unlikely to succeed, and that the costs associated with doing so
(notably payments to counsel) are likely to be wasted money. Professor Prince, in his
examination of California unconscionability law, singles out Graham as perhaps the most
awful among many awful California unconscionability decisions. He rightly regards the use
of unconscionability doctrine in commercial cases as “particularly troubling.” Several
“alarming” cases are characterized as “notorious” by Prince, of which Graham is
“preeminent.”62
Merchants are generally deemed capable of looking out for their own interests, and
may find it commercially advantageous to agree to dispute resolution provisions that are
quite different from the judicial model. A potentially biased decision maker, even a decision
by one party to the dispute, is common practice. The leading case grew out of a contract for
the sale of “power rectifier equipment” to the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA).63
The contract (and the request for bids) specified that any disputes that arose would be
decided by the Supervisor of the NYCTA (acting personally), and that “his decision shall be
conclusive, final and binding on the parties.” Westinghouse, of course, made the expected
“fox guarding the henhouse,” neutral decider as the essence of a fair decision, and
unconscionability arguments. The New York Court of Appeals rejected the Westinghouse
position, and did so unanimously. The goal of the unconscionability doctrine is to prevent
“oppression and unfair surprise ... and not of disturbance of allocation of risk.”64
Commercial parties dealing at arms length should be left to themselves. Westinghouse was
not entitled “to “pick and choose” among the provisions of its contract in this fashion.
The Westinghouse court observed that “billions of dollars of commercial
transactions and thousands of public work contracts” contain similar provisions. These are
common in private as well as public contracts. The AIA standard construction forms call
for the architect, who is hired by the project owner, to make numerous final determinations.
Such decisions, whether by an architect or the NYCTA, are not immune from judicial
review. However, success requires a showing that the official failed to make a good faith
decision on the merits, and this burden of proof is rarely satisfied.
Even if one thinks that Westinghouse goes too far, and that a party to a dispute
should not be permitted to also serve as a judge because of the enormous risk of bias, it
would not follow that Graham was rightly decided. Mere membership in a trade association
is a long way from having an interest in the outcome of a particular dispute, and trade

associations have rigorous, usually written, conflicts procedures for the selection of
arbitrators.
There were no demonstrated (or even alleged) problems with AFM arbitration, and
many thousands of such proceedings had been conducted without complaint by either Bill
Graham or other “mere supplicants.” The reason why this arbitration was different is
clear: Graham lost on the merits, and was looking for a way to avoid confirmation of the
arbitration award.
Even worse than the misguided reliance on unconscionability in Graham is the fact
that the California Supreme Court decided a different case than the one before it. At most,
uconscionability provides a defense to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement; it does
not provide a basis for vacatur of an arbitration award. The bases for vacating an award
are specified in the FAA and UAA, and unconscionability is not among them.
There is an arguable basis for vacating the award in Graham: evident partiality (or
corruption) by an arbitrator. Unfortunately for Graham (and the court), there was no
factual basis to support this statutory basis for vacatur. In the absence of actual or
apparent partiality, structural bias is the only available option, and this approach has been
almost universally rejected by the courts.65 As for the argument that the award should be
vacated because the underlying arbitration agreement was unconscionable and therefor not
enforceable, failure to make this argument at or before the arbitration proceeding provides
a classic example of waiver.66

4. Brower
Brower is another computer purchase case with Gateway as the seller. The customer
brought suit, Gateway sought to enforce its arbitration term, and the customer raised
unconscionability as a defense. At that time, the Gateway contract called for arbitration in
Chicago, under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).67
Correspondence with the ICC was to be directed to its Paris headquarters. The ICC
normally is used only for large dollar commercial cases, a fact reflected in its cost structure.
The minimum filing fee is $4,000, half of which is a nonrefundable registration fee.68 Since
this sum was greater than the cost of the computer, the unconscionablity theory was readily
accepted.
Gateway’s did not defend the ICC arbitration provision. Instead, Gateway pointed
out that its sales agreement had already been changed to provide for AAA arbitration. The
new policy applied to past as well as present customers. Notification of the change was
provided in a quarterly magazine sent to all Gateway customers, so this was not an eve of
litigation concession made to an unusually persistent customer. The customer’s response
was that the purported change was only a proposed modification, and it had not been
accepted. Also, there was no information in the record about the AAA’s fee structure. The
appellate court sent the case back to the trial court for the appointment of a substitute
arbitrator. Thus the customer won the ICC battle, but lost the arbitration war.

In the world of computers things change rapidly, and this 1997 decision is already
long out of date because Gateway subsequently has changed its approach to arbitration
several times.69 Brower merits no more than brief mention in future contracts casebooks,
and it surely will soon disappear from the leading cases.

5. The Fitzgibbon Approach

Professor Susan Fitzgibbon, in the only article that discusses the teaching of
arbitration in contracts, recommends the use of employment arbitration cases as a vehicle
for teaching about unconscionability.70 Her well thought out and balanced approach to the
subject is to be commended, and is preferable to the absence of any serious discussion of
arbitration in most contracts casebooks. The problem with this approach is that the
consideration of arbitration is a means to a different end – an analysis of unconscionability
doctrine and practice.
Fitzgibbon informs readers of the simple truth that much of the criticism of
employment arbitration reflects the discredited – in the courts if not the academy – view
that arbitration is “inferior” to litigation, and that most of this critique “flies in the face” of
the law as developed by the Supreme Court.71 Employees are far more likely to actually get
a “day in court” via arbitration than in a judicial forum. Fitzgibbon also explores the
evidence that litigation is not a useful option even for employees that get to court.72 The
majority of employment cases in federal trial courts are disposed of before trial, and 98
percent of these decisions favor employers.73 Of the cases that actually get to trial, the
employee prevails about one-third of the time.74 In sum, “far more employees win in
arbitration than in court,” and employees as a class win more in arbitration than in court.75
A dose of reality about employee concerns is important. The employment at will
doctrine is alive and well in America, however much it may be disparaged in the academy.
Hardly any aggrieved employees, even if they immediately obtain other employment,
possess the means to pay for counsel. Such clients do not “retain” counsel; they audition
before counsel in the hope of finding a lawyer who will take a case on a contingent fee basis.
And, like auditions in the theater, the answer usually is no.
Fitzgibbon recommends the use of three cases for teaching about arbitration and
unconscionability: Cole,76 Hooters,77 and Stirlen.78 Cole is Judge Harry Edwards’
thoughtful consideration of statutory arbitration claims that requires the employer to bear
the costs unique to arbitration, at least where they are greater than court filing fees.
Hooters is the leading unconscionability case, and as a decision from the 4th Circuit has far
greater precedential value than California state court decisions. In Stirlen, the court
refused to enforce the arbitration provision in a contract of employment negotiated by the
chief financial officer of Supercuts, which included a salary of $150,000, a $10,000 signing
bonus, stock options, bonus plan, and supplemental retirement. Indeed, the court
determined that the arbitration provision, which favored the employer in important

respects, was so “unconscionably one-sided and unfair in numerous respects” that the
unconscionable part could not be excised, so the entire arbitration term was invalid. Need it
be added that this is a California state court decision?

D. Remedial Powers of Arbitrators
1. Overview
The two arbitration remedies cases are Grayson-Robinson79 and Garrity,80 each a
quite dated decision from the New York Court of Appeals. Both should be excised from
contracts casebooks: Garrity because it does not reflect the law, and Grayson-Robinson
because it is old and unimportant. The most these decisions merit is brief mention in note
material.
There is an interesting contrast between the two arbitration remedies cases: Garrity
held that arbitrators have less power than courts in the context of punitive damages, while
Grayson-Robinson suggests that arbitrators in some instances have broader remedial
powers than courts. These two cases, or more recent ones, could be put together to provide
a nice comparison of the remedial authority of arbitrators and courts. No casebook has
adopted this approach.

2. Garrity
It says much about the law of arbitration as it appears in contracts casebooks that
the third most important case is a dated state court decision that reflects a minority position
at best, and probably is no longer the law even in New York.81 Garrity does have its
attractions as a teaching tool. The court split 4-3, with thoughtful majority and dissenting
opinions. Whether an arbitrator (a private decider) should be permitted to award
exemplary damages presents an important issue of principle, and thereby illuminates the
nature of arbitration. (The punitive damages award was modest, both in absolute and
relative terms – $45,000 compensatory and $7,500 punitive.) The majority position was that
sanctions beyond compensation should be limited to the State; punishment is not a function
that may be exercised by a privately appointed arbitrator, even if the parties purport to
expressly grant that power.
Readers of most contracts casebooks would not learn that Garrity is the minority
position among the states, or that Garrity is of little consequence today even in New York
because of federal preemption of state law. Few casebooks note that the Supreme Court’s
Mastrobuono decision eviscerated the Garrity approach in the most important substantive
context -- securities law claims.82 Mastrobuono involved an NASD arbitration under the
standard industry form agreement. The contract said nothing about punitive damages, but
it had a New York choice of law provision. The NASD Code provided arbitrators with
plenary remedial power, and in fact NASD arbitrators had often made punitive damages

awards. The Court concluded that the arbitration clause “surely does not support – indeed
it contradicts” the assertion that punitive damages are prohibited. The most that could be
said of the choice of law term is that it created an ambiguity, and in that event the principle
of contra proferentum required that any ambiguity be interpreted against the drafting
party.83 The Supreme Court determined that the best way to give meaning to both the
choice of law and the arbitration provision was to include substantive principles of New
York law, but to exclude “special rules limiting the authority of arbitrators.”84
After Mastrobuono, not even cases decided under New York law will be governed by
Garrity, where there is a nexus to interstate commerce. Subsequently, the New York Court
of Appeals adopted the Mastrobuono approach in its Sacharow decision.85 In Sacharow, the
court ruled that “attention must be paid” to Mastrobuono, and that a New York choice of
law provision incorporates substantive state law, but not restrictions on the authority of
arbitrators.86 Whatever little remains of state law restrictions on the remedial power of
arbitrators in New York, it is at least incumbent on casebooks that mention the Garrity
issue to point out these later developments.
Many federal and state statutes provide for the award of extra damages beyond
compensation for actual losses. A prohibition of such awards by arbitrators would preclude
arbitration of these claims. In authorizing arbitration of statutory claims, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that a claimant “does not forego the substantive rights afforded by
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral rather than a judicial forum.”87

3. Grayson-Robinson
Grayson-Robinson is correctly decided, but it is dated and not sufficiently important
for inclusion in contracts casebooks. The court divided 4-3, with a strong dissenting
opinion, so the case teaches well. The court recognized the traditional reluctance to order
specific performance of construction contracts, but replied that this approach is entirely
prudential. A court in the exercise of equitable power has the discretion to refuse a request
for specific enforcement, but it equally has discretion to grant such a request. As for
concerns about difficulty of supervision, mere speculation did not provide a basis for
refusing to enforce an arbitral award.
In a brief coda, the court states that there was no statutory basis for declining to
enforce the arbitration award. It also notes the policy of promoting arbitration, and
concerns about congested court calendars.
The dissenters would not enforce an order of specific relief beyond that which a
court would order, an approach that would require a determination of what a reasonable
trial court faced with the same situation would do. The dissent notes that supervision of the
ensuing performance will fall to the courts not the arbitrator, and that this “long and
acrimonious” dispute between these parties was likely to flare up anew during performance.

E. Labor Arbitration

For better or worse, the resolution of grievances under a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA), a process that culminates in arbitration, is not discussed in most
contracts casebooks or courses. Only the Macauley and Macneil casebooks, both of which
devote particular attention to relational contracts, provide more than passing mention of
labor-management relations topics. Each reproduces an arbitration award, Trans World
Airlines (TWA).88 No other casebook mentions TWA, yet this use in two casebooks was
sufficient for TWA to rank number seven among the leading cases.
It certainly is a good idea for contracts students to see a real arbitration award
rather than just reading cases about arbitration. Alas, the award is from 1965, and involved
the “grooming and appearance” of a stewardess who was stationed at an airport called
Idlewild and employed by an airline named Trans World. Talk about dated! Many faculty,
not to mention students, will not recognize the former name of John F. Kennedy
International Airport in New York City.
To the extent that students conclude from reading TWA that arbitrators generally
produce substantive written opinions, they are misled. Written opinions are common in
labor-management grievance proceedings, but they are unusual in other domestic contexts.
Parties to an arbitration are, of course, free to require a reasoned written opinion, but the
consequence will be delay, expense, and an increased likelihood of a judicial appeal. Since
an important goal of arbitration is to avoid these consequences, written opinion
requirements are uncommon in domestic (unlike international) commercial arbitration.

VI. THE ARBITRATION CASES IN THE CASEBOOKS

A. Overview

The central observation about the leading arbitration cases in contracts casebooks is
that there are so few of them. And, hardly any of these cases can, in any meaningful sense,
be called leading. As indicated by the headings in the preceding part, arbitration cases do fit
easily into a small number of doctrinal categories, of which contract formation and
unconscionability are the most important. The discussion in this part focuses of the leading
cases and categories, but it is informed by the entire body of arbitration cases in contracts
casebooks.

B. Precedent Value of Cases

Precedent value should be an important factor in the selection of cases for inclusion
in a casebook, which means higher court decisions should be preferred to lower court
decisions. Where a decision does not reflect the usual state law approach, as in Garrity, that
fact should be clearly noted. One objective is to teach students about the law of a
jurisdiction, if not of the land. Outdated decisions and lower court opinions simply do not
perform that function.
To the extent that arbitration cases are presented at all in contracts casebooks, a
surprising number were decided by lower courts. Even a few unpublished decisions (in the
official reporters) are used as main cases. A reasonable reader might conclude, wrongly,
that there are no published cases on point. In all events, unpublished decisions (which
typically may not be cited in courts) should be relegated to notes and questions. Strangest of
all is the inclusion in the Murphy casebook of an unreported arbitration decision by a U.S.
district court that was reversed in a published court of appeals decision – in the material on
capacity to contract no less.89 [Probably the casebook was in the last stages of production
when the court of appeals reversed, so the only option was to include a citation to the later
opinion.] The Epstein casebook uses Hooters as a main case, but the district court rather
than the court of appeals version. Clearly, the higher court opinion should be used in these
situations; particularly noteworthy facets of the lower court decision can be addressed in
note material.
A distinctive feature of arbitration law is that the U.S. Supreme Court is a central
player, a feature that is all the more striking because the highest court in the land is largely
absent from the law of contracts. This circumstance suggests that casebook authors ought
to make a special point of using U.S. Supreme Court cases to elucidate arbitration issues. At
a minimum, U.S. district court and mid-level state appellate court opinions ordinarily
should be avoided. The pairing of the Klocek and Hill decisions is an instance where use of
a lower court opinion makes sense.
A majority of the leading casebook arbitration cases are badly dated: GraysonRobinson (1960); TWA (1965); Garrity (1976); Itoh (1977); and Graham (1981). These
decisions all precede the modern arbitration revolution, and generally do not reflect current
arbitration law and practice. They should all be replaced with more recent cases or
materials. The pace of change in arbitration law means that even recent decisions by
important courts have a short shelf life. Armendariz (2000) is already outdated, and should
be replaced by the Little decision (2003) – also from the California Supreme Court.90
Gateway has changed its approach to arbitration several times since the Brower (1997)
decision, which suffers from the further defect of being decided by a lower court.

Of the leading cases, only the Hill and Klocek decisions are worthy of inclusion in
contracts casebooks, and discussion of arbitration in these cases is minimal. Thus, in
considering alternatives to what is presently in the casebooks, authors can begin with a
largely clean slate.91

C. Leading Jurisdictions

In terms of the jurisdiction of origin, both among the leading cases and other
arbitration cases in contracts casebooks, two states predominate: California and New York.
As the two leading commercial states in the country, this outcome is not surprising. These
states are also well represented in contracts casebooks on other topics. Perhaps more
surprising is the considerable reference to cases that originated in Alabama –
predominantly from the state courts, but from the federal courts as well. The reason is that
Alabama is the most anti-arbitration state in the country (with Montana in second place),
and casebook authors are generally sympathetic to the anti- arbitration approach.
Two 7th Circuit decisions are on the list of leading cases – Hill and Itoh. Decisions
from the 7th Circuit are having an increasing impact in law school casebooks, largely due to
the prodigious output of former University of Chicago Law School Professors Richard
Posner and Frank Easterbrook. Their Chicago colleague Diane Wood appears to be
continuing this tradition,
The casebooks give far more attention to state cases and state law than to federal
cases and federal law, both because contract law is state law and because there are far more
state than federal decisions. It may also be that state cases are used, notably those from
Alabama and California, because they reflect a position that doubts the value of arbitration
in a way not seen in federal court decisions. The central place of federal law in the context
of arbitration is not adequately reflected in the casebooks. In particular, far greater use
should be made of U.S. Supreme Court decisions.

D. Gateway Arbitration

A truly remarkable feature of the leading cases is that the same firm was the
defendant in the top two cases, and three of the top five – Gateway.92 [The former name,
Gateway 2000, was dropped as the turn of the millennium approached, and the “2000"
appellation became dated instead of futuristic.] There are additional Gateway appellate
cases, and an unknowable – but surely exponentially larger – number of trial court
decisions.93
By way of contrast, Dell Computer – which also sells computer equipment by mail
and mandates arbitration of disputes – has avoided litigation about the arbitration term in
its form contract.94 The strength of Dell’s economic performance compared to that of

Gateway, suggests that engaging in litigation with customers, win or lose, is a poor business
strategy. Lawyers need to know about, and even be prepared to remind their commercial
clients of, this business reality.
Gateway has used at least three different approaches to requiring arbitration of
customer disputes. The transaction in Brower took place in 1995. At that time the Gateway
form contract called for arbitration in Chicago, under South Dakota law, before a single
arbitrator, pursuant to the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration. The ICC process is
designed for (and limited to) large commercial disputes, for which the initial fee of $4,000 is
a modest sum.
By the time Brower was decided in 1998, Gateway had offered all its customers, past
and present, the option of AAA instead of ICC arbitration. And, although court regularly
upheld the Chicago choice of forum provision, Gateway now allowed for the arbitration at a
mutually agreeable place, with consent “not ... unreasonably withheld.”95 This change was
clearly beneficial to customers. The new provisions were widely publicized by Gateway, not
just offered when litigation arose.
By December, 1998 the Gateway contract had dropped the ICC, and specified that
arbitration would be administered by the AAA – of course, for a fee.96 (Whatever Gateway
may have intended, the prior contract called for use of the ICC rules but did not specify
ICC administration.) The contract also stated that the arbitrator was without authority to
award “special, exemplary, consequential, punitive, incidental or indirect damages, or
attorneys’ fees,” and that the parties waived any right to recover such damages. [Such
limitations should not be enforced by courts or arbitrators where they are inconsistent with
consumer protection or other statutes.]
The AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocol establishes minimum standards for
arbitration plans that it will administer. The Protocol specifies that customers must have
the option of bringing their claims in local small claims courts. The objective is to provide a
judicial alternative for modest sized claims. In many states, claims of up to $5,000 may be
brought in small claims courts. Even where the dollar limit is lower, it still exceeds the price
of virtually all consumer computer systems. This approach, which effectively would allow
customers to opt out of arbitration, was unsatisfactory to Gateway, so the company made an
alternative arrangement for dispute resolution services.
By 2001, Gateway’s form arbitration agreement called for administration of disputes
by the National Arbitration Forum (NAF).97 The NAF has found a market niche by
providing low cost arbitration of small dollar disputes. NAF offers a cafeteria plan to
consumers, with higher prices for more expansive hearings. For claims up to $5,000, there
is a $49 filing fee, which purchases a documentary hearing. An additional $75 is charged
for a participatory hearing of up to one hour. Gateway pays an administrative fee of $250
per case. While NAF can tailor its services (and prices) to the needs of business customers,
the Gateway procedures (and prices) are typical.

The economic viability of NAF depends on the satisfaction of Gateway (and other
merchants) with their dispute resolution process. This “repeat player” factor does not mean
that Gateway expects to win most of the time, or that it would casually shift to a different
dispute resolution provider. Gateway really does want a decently fair process, and the costs
associated with shifting to a different system are substantial. Still, consumers might
legitimately be concerned that NAF is ultimately concerned with satisfying its regular
customers, not “one shot” players.
The one constant in the Gateway arbitration provisions has been the use of South
Dakota law. The use of a single forum offers simplicity, and therefore lower costs, for
Gateway (and the many firms that adopt this approach). The choice of South Dakota does
not reflect any particular legal advantage; rather it was chosen because Gateway’s business
home is there. South Dakota has enacted the UCC, and the common law of contracts is
generally the same as that throughout the country. Besides, virtually all disputes between
Gateway and its customers revolve around questions of fact rather than issues of law. Thus
the difficulty of finding a lawyer with knowledge of South Dakota law has not been a
practical problem for Gateway customers.

E. The Anti-Arbitration Animus in the Academy

Judging by the selections of casebook authors, together with the law review literature,
opposition to arbitration has mostly disappeared from the courts but it remains alive and
well in the law schools. Often the tenor of the professorial view is evident from the titles of
articles. For example, Jean Sternlight writes about “Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration.”98 Mark Budnitz regards arbitration as “A Serious
Threat to Consumer Protection.”99 According to David Schwartz, the Supreme Court in its
arbitration decisions “has created a monster.”100 While these critiques focus on consumer
and employment arbitration, other attacks are not so limited. Professors Carrington and
Haagen tell us: “Those who have been prejudiced by the Court’s handiwork include many
American consumers, patients, workers, investors, shopkeepers, shippers, and
passengers.”101 Shopkeepers is a quaint word designed to evoke “Mom and Pop” stores, but
these are usually substantial businesses, and most people would think that commercial
shippers – typically large corporations – are able to protect their own interests.102
The views of Professor Charles Knapp are worthy of particular attention because he
is the author of a leading contracts casebook. His recent arbitration article closes on this
baleful note:
“Can powerful private interests, with the ability to control most of the terms of most
of the contracts they make, deprive large segments of American society of their access
to the courts for which all of us pay, and to which all of us have historically had
access. The answer until now is – sadly, to some of us – that apparently they can.

And do.
And will.”103
Earlier in the article, Professor Knapp drew an analogy between arbitration and the Nazi
holocaust: “Left unchecked, mandatory arbitration will effectively ‘solve’ the adhesion
problem ... in much the same way as the Austrians in the 1938 Anschluss solved their Nazi
problem: by handing over the keys to the city.” Almost nobody takes such an apocalyptic
view of arbitration, but there are many other critics and few supporters of arbitration in the
academy.104
The choice of arbitration materials in the contracts casebooks suggests considerable
doubt about the value of arbitration, at least for consumer and employment claims. This
conclusion is necessarily a tentative one, because the purpose of casebooks is to raise
questions and alternatives rather than to offer value judgments. To the extent that
arbitration is considered at all, there is an almost obsessive focus on unconscionability. The
focus of whether merchant sellers can succeed in imposing hidden terms, including
arbitration, on consumers does not present arbitration in a favorable light.
Just to be sure there is no doubt, let me state clearly that scholars can and should
make informed judgments, and criticism of courts is perfectly appropriate. However, the
contracts casebooks provide students with a jaundiced view of arbitration, while teaching
little about how the process works or its benefits. I suggest that this approach may reflect
adverse views of arbitration by the casebook authors.105

VII. ARBITRATION IN THE CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT

No article about contract law would be complete without a discussion of the relevant
provisions of the Restatement of Contracts. The Restatement has almost nothing to say
about arbitration, so this topic can be treated with dispatch. The Restatement was adopted
by the American Law Institute in May 1979, and reflects the culmination of a process that
began in 1962. This timing explains why this most important persuasive authority in the
field of contract law has little to say about arbitration. The Index to the Restatement
includes precisely two entries under the heading of Arbitration – the same number as for
Habitual Drunkards, and far fewer than Intoxicated Persons (five entries) and Mentally Ill
Persons (six entries plus six subheadings).
Thanks to the wonders of computer assisted research, it is possible to state with
reasonable confidence that the body of the Restatement (excluding the accompanying
illustrations) contains only three references to arbitration, and that the only discussion of any
consequence is in the context of judicial remedies, albeit not in the black letter provisions.

Section 345 lists the available judicial remedies. Comment e addresses the
enforcement of arbitration awards. It states that arbitrations has an “important and growing
role” in the resolution of private contract disputes, as well as a decline in judicial hostility
toward arbitration. Although arbitration is not a judicial remedy, court are involved
through the confirmation (or vacatur) of arbitration awards. However, this topic is beyond
the scope of the Restatement because judicial review of arbitration award is based on state
statutes. The FAA is not mentioned.
In the material on specific enforcement, section 366 addresses the difficulty in
enforcement or supervision for a court as a factor in granting or denying specific
performance. Comment a, closes with the observation favoring judicial enforcement of an
order for specific relief by an arbitrator. Due to the limited statutory review of arbitral
awards, courts might confirm an award granting specific relief even though it would not
itself order specific performance in the same situation. No mention is made of the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, although such enforcement is an important example
of specific relief.
The other two mentions of arbitration in the Restatement – and they are no more than
that – can be quickly stated. The Introduction to Chapter 5, The Statute of Frauds, notes
that there are additional writing requirements for some contracts, of which arbitration
agreements are an example. The supporting reference is to the UAA, but the parallel
provision of the FAA goes unmentioned. The Introduction to Chapter 8, Unenforceability on
Grounds of Public Policy, states that rules are not included for fields in which legislation is
preeminent, such as arbitration.
The illustrations to the Restatement might contain additional references to
arbitration, but only a single instance has come to my attention: illustrations 2 and 3 to
section 261. These two illustrations are found in the materials on express conditions, and are
used to illustrate the distinction between promises and conditions. Two provisions from
insurance policies are contrasted. An agreement that calls for disputes to be submitted to
arbitration is a promise to arbitrate, but does not make an award a condition precedent to
the insurer’s obligation to pay. By way of contrast, if the agreement states that a loss shall
not be payable until 60 days after an award then an award is a condition of the insurer’s
obligation to pay. These illustrations do suggest that arbitration provisions are often used in
contracts of insurance, which is more true now than it was some twenty-five years ago.

VIII. CONTRACTS AND ARBITRATION: SOME SUGGESTIONS

Better coverage of arbitration could be readily achieved, in large part because the bar
has been set so low. Essential to success is considering arbitration as a self-contained topic,
rather than as an aspect of formation, unconscionability, remedies, or some other doctrinal
category. For the many casebooks and courses that give little if any attention to arbitration,

Samuel Gompers offered the classic one word answer: “More.”106 The purpose of the
discussion in this part is to be a bit more specific.
My proposals begin with an essentially clean slate because, for a variety of reasons
discussed earlier in the article, none of the arbitration materials commonly appearing in the
contracts casebooks merit continued use. Hill and Klosek are fine cases for addressing
contract formation and terms questions, but the arbitration setting context is quite
incidental. These cases do not address the possibility that the contract dealings do not satisfy
the FAA writing requirement – “a written provision in ... a contract ... to settle by
arbitration” – that is distinct from any applicable Statute of Frauds.107

A. Arbitration as Statutory Law

The beginning approach should be to explore the ways in which arbitration is
fundamentally different from the rest of contract law. While contract law is based on state
law and cases (apart from the UCC), arbitration is grounded in a federal statute that largely
preempts state law, including state statutes. The FAA is short, and little changed since its
original enactment in 1925, so it makes sense to reproduce the full text of the statute.
At the same time, the UAA (1955) should be introduced; it largely tracks the FAA,
and has been enacted in most states. The RUAA is important because of its recent
provenance – promulgated by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
2000. The RUAA is more comprehensive than, but not inconsistent with, the UAA (or FAA).
The major innovation is to address a considerable number of topics not covered in the UAA
or FAA. Examples (with section number) are: provisional remedies (8, 18); consolidation
(10); arbitrator disclosure standards (12); immunity from suit of arbitrators and provider
organizations (14); powers of arbitrators to manage the arbitration process (15); and
remedial powers of arbitrators, including forum costs, attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages
(21).108 The RUAA (unlike the FAA and UAA) includes commentary (like the UCC), that
provides a useful discussion of numerous important arbitration topics.
The “tradition” of hostility to arbitration is by now a piece of history – Congress
enacted the FAA over 75 years ago. The “official history” of that now discredited tradition is
the erudite discussion by Judge Jerome Frank in the Kulukundis case.109 This decision has
been cited with approval in some 200 published opinions, including by the Supreme Court.110
The modern tradition is the strong public policy in support of arbitration.

B. Division of Authority Between Arbitrators and Courts

1. Arbitrability

As arbitration is a creature of contract, a court will only order arbitration pursuant to
a binding agreement. While the courts favor arbitration, there is no presumption that
parties agreed to arbitrate. The leading case of First Options v. Kaplan explains , explains
the division of authority between courts and arbitrators.111 Essentially, a court will
determine two “gateway” issues: whether the parties agree to arbitrate; and, if so, whether
the agreement to arbitrate is sufficiently expansive to include the dispute at hand. Outside
the United States, arbitrators have greater authority to determine their own authority
(competence-competence).112
Before anyone concludes that the dividing line between judicial and arbitral authority
is reasonably clear, consider that the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this topic in no less than
three cases during the 2002-2003 term. The Howsam decision finally put to rest an issue that
had divided the federal circuits, as well as several state supreme courts, by ruling that the
“eligibility rule” was to be applied by arbitrators not courts.113 The universally used
standard customer-broker contract specifies that disputes are eligible for arbitration only if
the precipitating event occurred within six years of the filing of the claim. The fear of the
securities firms was that an arbitrator, outraged by the behavior of a firm, would toll time
limits. Claims that are ineligible for arbitration still can be brought in court, in the unlikely
event that the limitations period has not yet expired. Eligibility determinations require an
examination of the facts surrounding a claim, which is a matter for arbitrators not courts.
This is the right result, because the dispute was subject to arbitration, else the eligibility rule
is inapplicable, and the issue is whether the dispute is still eligible for arbitration.
In Pacificare a group of physicians brought suit against managed-health-care
organizations for failure to make payment for services rendered to covered patients.114
Among their claims, the physicians sought recovery under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).115 That RICO claims are a proper subject for
arbitration was already well established, and was not disputed here.116 Although RICO
provides for the award of treble damages, the contracts at issue all expressly limited the
authority of arbitrators to award “punitive or exemplary damages.” The lower courts
declined to enforce the arbitration provision because the remedial limitation prevented the
claimants from obtaining “meaningful relief” for their statutory claim.117
The Court declined to address the remedial limitation issue at all, because such a
ruling would be “premature;” put another way, the matter failed the test of “ripeness.”118
The damages limitation was deemed to be “ambiguous,” and there was “uncertainty” about
what the parties intended by the damages limitation. [One is tempted to ask, which part of
“no punitive or exemplary damages” doesn’t the Supreme Court understand?] The Court
refused “on the basis of mere speculation” to consider how an arbitrator might interpret
“these ambiguous agreements ... and the antecedent question of how the ambiguity is to be
resolved.”119 Would the same result pertain if the physicians sought a judicial declaration
that the damages limitation was unconscionable under state contract law?
Finally, in Bazzle the Court held that the question of whether a contract permitted
class arbitration was an issue for the arbitrator rather than a court.120 Therefore, the Court
remanded the case so that the arbitrator, instead of the trial court, could make the

determination whether the contract language allowed for class arbitration. The Court did so
notwithstanding that the class arbitration had taken place, the arbitrator rendered an
award, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina had confirmed the award.121
Arbitrability issues are likely to continue to vex the courts. Apart from the two basic
gateway questions of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and whether an arbitration
agreement covers the dispute at hand, any and all issues are potentially subject to initial
determination in arbitration. It is uncertain whether even clearly drafted contract
provisions will succeed in redirecting issues from arbitrators to courts.

2. The Separability Doctrine

The most important single arbitration contract topic is the “separability doctrine,”
and the leading case is the Supreme Court’s Prima Paint decision.122 Hardly any of the
casebooks address separability, and not one makes use of Prima Paint.123 The underlying
dispute presented a classic contract scenario: the sale of a business gone sour.124 Buyer
claimed fraud in the inducement (and perhaps other contract defenses). Seller responded
that full information was available to buyer, and the claims amounted to nothing more than
“buyer’s remorse” by someone who lacked the knowledge and background to run the
business properly. Absent an arbitration provision, the parties would proceed through the
litigation process and eventually a court would sort out the rights and duties of the parties,
and order appropriate remedies.
Now, consider the impact of an arbitration provision under this scenario. The
claimant (buyer) brings suit, while seller wants the dispute to be settled in arbitration. Buyer
argues that but for the fraud in the inducement it would not have entered the contract, so the
arbitration term should not be enforced. Instead, the court should proceed to consider the
fraud claim, and only if that claim is rejected should the dispute be sent to arbitration. This
is the standard contract law model, and Justice Black’s dissent vigorously argued favor of
this approach.
The majority, however, enforced the arbitration term because the fraud claim related
to the contract in general, rather than the the arbitration provision in particular. The
majority read the FAA as mandating the separability approach, because the Act calls for
courts to order arbitration upon being satisfied that “the making of the agreement for
arbitration is not in issue ....”125 This approach honored both the language of the FAA, and
the statutory goal that arbitration be speedily available rather than “subject to delay and
obstruction in the courts.”126 The statutory language certainly permits this reading, but
Justice Black seems right that the FAA does not require this result. However, the majority
has the better of the policy argument. Fraud in the inducement was the only real issue in
Prima Paint, and its resolution required a fact-intensive inquiry. If courts undertake this
determination, any colorable claim of fraud in the inducement would postpone arbitration,

and would enmesh the courts in the merits of the dispute, thereby effectively preempting
arbitration.
The separability doctrine states that the arbitration term must be considered
separately from the substantive contract provisions. If a party claims that it was
fraudulently induced to agree to arbitration, that claim is heard by a court, which will order
arbitration only if this defense is rejected. Otherwise the dispute is sent to arbitration for a
decision on the merits. The separability doctrine has two important consequences. First, it
sends most breach of contract claims directly to arbitration. Second, the arbitrator is
empowered to render a decision even if the fraud in the inducement defense is successful.
The adoption of separability as federal law under the FAA did not end the matter in
Prima Paint, because the dispute arose in a state (New York) that rejected the separability
doctrine. So long as the transaction involved interstate commerce, held the Supreme court,
the FAA preempted the inconsistent state law.127 Again, Justice’s Black’s dissenting opinion
vigorously contested this approach. This issue illustrates the importance of the Erie doctrine,
which students will have considered in civil procedure, and the determination of whether a
matter is determined to be “substantive” or “procedural.”128 Separability also demonstrates
a perhaps not previously appreciated consequence of Erie: while the usual impact of Erie is
to give greater effect to state law, in tandem with federal preemption the consequence is to
reduce the role of state law.129
The separability doctrine applies to contract law defenses generally, not just to fraud
in the inducement. Some courts have even applied separability to claims of lack of capacity
to contract.130 The doctrine applies equally to all parties to an agreement, although usually it
is the seller that seeks arbitration and the buyer who wants to have a matter resolved by a
court. What if a buyer claims that a dispute should not be sent to arbitration due to
unconscionability? The logic of the separability doctrine suggests that this matter should be
resolved by the arbitrator. The courts have not heretofore applied separability to
unconscionability claims, but this could easily happen – and the Supreme Court has shown
the way. It the Casarotto decision the Court made a point of noting that the FAA imposes
the same restrictions on courts as on legislatures, particularly as regards unconscionability.
“It bears reiteration ... [that] a court may not rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for
this would enable the court to effect what ... the state legislature cannot.”131
Today the separability doctrine is almost universally accepted by the states, including
New York, whose earlier contrary view was at issue in Prima Paint.132 Even the drafters of
the RUAA, strong supporters of state arbitration law, accepted the separability doctrine.133
Separability is not some American aberration. Indeed, separability is “a conceptual
cornerstone of international arbitration.”134 If contracts students could read only a single
case about arbitration, my choice would be Prima Paint.

3. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards

A meaningful introduction to judicial review of arbitration awards can be provided
through textual material. The grounds for vacating arbitral awards are specified in the
FAA, and are extremely limited – much more limited than judicial review of trial court
decisions.135 Errors of law is not among those grounds. (Unlike the FAA, the English
Arbitration Act provides for judicial review of matters of law in arbitration awards.)136
There are two widely, but not universally, recognized nonstatutory grounds for judicial
review: public policy and manifest disregard of the law. Both grounds are quite narrow in
scope, and such claims rarely succeed.
Whether parties can by contract expand the scope of judicial review beyond that
specified by the FAA is a vexed question, on which the courts have taken a variety of
positions. The issue was sufficiently controversial that the drafters of the RUAA could not
reach a consensus, and so declined to take no position at all.137 The most interesting judicial
decision is LaPine, where the three judges produced three opinions.138

C. How Arbitration Works
An arbitral hearing is a different process from a court trial, so the key features of the
proceeding need to be understood. Institutional players (trade organizations) perform a
central role in the efficient disposition of disputes through arbitration.

1. Arbitration Procedure
An exclusive focus on lawsuits will teach student little about how the arbitration
process differs from judicial trials. Above all, there are no juries. Arbitration procedures
are much less formal than in trials. Telephone conferences among the parties and
arbitrators are common. Depositions and other forms of discovery typically are quite
limited. Hearings take place in hotels or offices, not facilities dedicated to hearing cases. The
(exclusionary) rules of evidence are inapplicable. Evidence is more likely to be presented in
written rather than spoken form. Oral testimony commonly takes the form of narrative
statements rather than the question and answer format of judicial trials. In important ways,
an arbitration proceeding is more like an administrative hearing than a court trial.
Arbitrators are selected pursuant to the contract between the disputants. The parties
can, and often do, specify particular experience or qualifications. Although many arbitrators
are lawyers, and may even be former judges, arbitrators frequently are not lawyers.
Arbitrators do normally have expertise or experience with respect to the subject matter of
the dispute. In labor arbitration, it is common for the arbitrator to have dispute resolution
experience but not a law degree; the representatives of management and union may be
salaried staff who are not lawyers. Commercial parties often entrust large dollar disputes
for unreviewable decision to arbitrators without legal training.

Unlike in court trials, it is realistic for parties to appear without counsel.
Alternatively, the informality of arbitration proceedings allows for quality representation by
persons who are not lawyers, but who have other relevant are experienced in the trade or
industry..

2. Administering Institutions

Arbitration is an ad hoc procedure. The office of arbitrator expires upon the issuing
of a final award in a dispute.139 (This is an application of the principle of functus officio.)
Reviewing courts can send cases back to a trial court for clarification, a new trial, or other
action, even if the judge that conducted the trial is retired or deceased. The office continues;
only the role incumbent changes. By way of contrast, court normally cannot send a dispute
back to an arbitrator. If an award cannot be confirmed it must be vacated, whereupon the
parties have to start all over. A court can modify or correct an arbitration award, but only
in narrowly limited circumstances specified in the FAA.140 If this seems obvious, consider
that the Supreme Court recently purported to remand a case for “the arbitrator” to decide a
contract interpretation issue.141
Courts are an institutional presence in a public building that is open to all as stated
hours. Court staff perform important if unglamourous administrative functions for
prospective litigants, such as assigning cause numbers to newly filed cases, date-stamping
documents, and serving as the official repository for “the record” in a case. There are judges
in place to whom cases are assigned, a process in which the parties have no role.
Persons who agree to arbitration can leave the selection of an arbitrator to be worked
out as needed, but at that juncture they have become participants in a serious dispute so the
cooperation essential to prompt selection of an arbitrator may not go smoothly. Better, they
can create a mechanism for appointment in the event of a dispute, but implementation still
requires some cooperation among disputing parties. The standard version of this approach
is that the two parties each appoint an arbitrator, and those two appoint a third.142 This
usually works well for large dollar disputes, but the use of three arbitrators is unduly
expensive for smaller disputes. Also, the appointment process often is not completed quickly.
The FAA makes provision for judicial appointment of an arbitrator, but that takes control
entirely out of the hands of the parties – who cared enough about process control to provide
for arbitration.143
These situations suggest the need for neutral institutions to administer arbitration
proceedings. Among arbitral organizations, the AAA is paramount.144 The AAA was
founded by the leaders of the Chamber of Commerce responsible for the enactment of the
1920 New York arbitration act, which became the model for the FAA. Thus the AAA was
literally present at the creation of modern arbitration, and it has been the leading arbitration

institution in the United States ever since. The AAA has regional offices throughout the
country.
The AAA has performed a number of important functions for the arbitration
community over the decades. It maintains panels of arbitrators by subject matter expertise
in different geographical areas. The AAA provides lists of potential arbitrators to
disputants, and administers the arbitrator selection process.
The AAA has rules and procedures for arbitration, so that parties do not need to
negotiate their own procedures, although they can and sometimes do so. Rather than dispute
about how to conduct a dispute resolution process that they do not expect to use, parties can
simply state that any disputes will be subject to arbitration under the AAA’s Arbitration
Rules for Commercial Disputes then in force.145 [The AAA, of course, wants to be the
administering body, but parties can specify the AAA’s rules without providing for AAA
administration.] The AAA also has standard arbitration clauses for every situation that is
likely to arise. Indeed, a reading of these provisions provides a good introduction to the
problems that arise during arbitration proceedings. The standard general arbitration clause
for future disputes (shorn of the references to AAA administration) provides:
“Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration, and judgment on the award rendered by the
arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.”
This approach has been in use for many decades, and has repeatedly been upheld by courts
as encompassing (almost) all disputes that arise between contracting parties. [A serious
drafting problem is the proclivity of some courts to interpret general arbitration provisions
as excluding some disputes.] While the standard law school lesson is not to mindlessly adopt
form provisions, the opposite danger also needs to be borne in mind. Quality model
provisions promulgated by trade associations such as the AAA have been created by
sophisticated experts, and changed periodically to reflect experience with their use. These
should be altered only when necessary – else a malpractice claim looms.
In addition, the AAA performs educational functions, produces various publications
that cover contemporary arbitration (and related dispute resolution) issues, and generally
seeks to promote arbitration. Together with the ABA, the AAA has produced a widely relied
upon Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. It has sponsored due process
protocols for consumer and employment arbitration that set minimum standards for
contracts under which the AAA will administer arbitration, although this approach has
resulted in opening a market niche for organizations such as the National Arbitration Forum
that are less fastidious about the circumstances under which they will provide arbitration
services. Gateway is among the organizations that have switched from the AAA to NAF.
There is a whole world of specialized arbitration rules and requirements organized by
trade associations for their members, who commonly are required to settle all disputes with
other members through the organization’s dispute resolution system. This approach has
been in use for centuries, long before the law was willing to enforce arbitration agreements

and awards. The process functions effectively apart from the legal system because trade
associations often rely primarily on internal rather than jural sanctions to mandate
arbitration of disputes and compliance with awards.146
Arbitration is particularly important in the international arena, and institutional
structures are of particular importance.147 The Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) has been adopted by over
125 countries, including all major commercial nations.148 (In contrast, no country has been
willing to enter a treaty with the United States for the recognition and enforcement of court
judgments.) The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, promulgated by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), has been adopted by
over 35 nations.149 The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is the leading provider
of international arbitration rules and administration. In contrast to domestic arbitration,
the number of proceedings are small but the amounts at stake are large.

D. Commerce Clause Preemption of State Law

It is perfectly clear that the FAA preempts inconsistent state statutes, and not just
state arbitration laws. Two prominent examples are consumer protection legislation and
state statutes designed to level the playing field between local franchisees and national
franchisors. The preemptive effect of the FAA is based on the commerce clause, and
therefore applies to proceedings in state as well as federal courts. The Court so ruled in
Prima Paint, and then it did so more explicitly in Southland, over a powerful dident by
Justice O’Connor.150 In enacting the FAA, Congress exercised its full commerce power.151
The Court reaffirmed its Southland decision in Allied-Bruce, despite an amicus brief
filed by twenty state attorneys-general requesting the Court to abandon Southland.152 An
amicus brief by a group of law professors in Bazzle seeking the same result did not receive so
much as a mention by the Court.153 This situation nicely encapsulates the different views of
arbitration prevailing at the Supreme Court and in the law schools.
Even when transactions are subject to the FAA, disputes are commonly heard in state
rather than federal courts. The FAA, unlike many federal statutes, does not provide an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction, so there must be another basis to obtain a hearing
in federal court – usually diversity of citizenship (plus minimum amount in controversy). In
hearing cases subject to the FAA, the state courts use local procedural rules rather than the
federal rules. In addition, state contract law is applicable in the resolution of arbitration
disputes in both state and federal courts.154 Thus courts commonly are required to apply a
mixture of state and federal law in resolving litigation about arbitration.
One consequence of the considerable place for state law is that it permits state courts
hostile to arbitration to frustrate the federal policy that strongly favors arbitration.
Alabama and Montana are the leading proponents of this approach. (Apart from the

widespread use of unconscionability to limit arbitration, the California courts are generally
supportive of arbitration).
Alabama and Montana are engaged in a campaign of civil disobedience in opposition
to arbitration, in open defiance of the Supreme Court. The Court’s Allied-Bruce decision
reversed the refusal of the Alabama Supreme Court to enforce an agreement to arbitrate.155
The Court did so again in 2003, after the Alabama courts tried once again to adopt a
“misguided” and “improperly cramped” reading of commerce to avoid federal
preemption.156
The best case for illustrating both the scope of commerce clause preemption, and the
“populist” anti-arbitration position is Casarotto. In Casarotto v. Lombardi, the Montana
Supreme Court refused to order arbitration.157 Justice Trieweiler wrote the majority
opinion, “in language appropriate for judicial precedent.” In addition, he wrote a special
concurring opinion that says what he really thinks – this is a well-written and genuinely
angry attack on the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence.158
In its Casarotto opinion, the Court did not acknowledge let alone address Justice
Trieweiler’s arguments. Instead, the Court sharply observed, relying on Southland and
Allied-Bruce:
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract
law principles .... What states may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to
enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its
arbitration clause.159
Casarotto was 8-1 decision, with only Justice Thomas dissenting (based on his rejection of
Southland). The Court stated its strong support for arbitration, and expressed a thinly
veiled irritation at the failure of state courts to get the message.160
Montana is still at it, having refused to order arbitration in its recent Kloss v. Jones
decision, but this time the Supreme Court declined to review this erroneous decision.161 The
Alabama and Montana courts may continue their anti-arbitration efforts, but their views
should not be confused with the law of any other jurisdiction (not even California).

E. Arbitration of Statutory Claims

On the question of whether claims based on statutory rights are subject to arbitration
the Supreme Court (and American law) did a 180 degree turn, a development best explicated
through securities cases (no securities law background is needed). The purpose is to
illustrate the dramatic change in the judicial attitude toward arbitration. Half a century ago,
in Wilko v. Swan, the Court held that claims under the Securities Act were not subject to
mandatory arbitration, and refused to enforce a contractual arbitration provision.162 By the

late 1980s, the Supreme Court had rejected its earlier position about the arbitration of
statutory claims, and expressly abandoned Wilko.163 The Court has adopted the same
approach to employment arbitration of statutory rights.164
F. Employment Arbitration and Unconscionability165

Examination of unconscionability and arbitration is best achieved by focusing on
employment cases. (The use of arbitration in the consumer transactions is considered in the
context of formation and contract terms.) Three recent cases should suffice to canvass the
issues. The maximum unconscionability approach is best illustrated by the California
Supreme Court’s Little decision (in lieu of Armendariz).166 The 4th Circuit’s decision in
Hooters should meet should meet the unconscionability standard of nearly all courts.167
Although this may come as a surprise to many law professors, there are vast swaths of
American where a 4th circuit opinion is considered more persuasive than a California
Supreme Court decision.
In Martindale, the widely esteemed New Jersey Supreme Court enforced an
arbitration term against an employee.168 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stein has the
integrity to admit that any employment arbitration decisions manipulate contract doctrine to
achieve a desired result – one which Stein supports: “In my view, public policy requires this
Court to invalidate a mandatory arbitration agreement ... that a prospective employee is
forced to sign as a condition of being considered for a job.” For better or worse, that is not
the law, but the Martindale opinions provide an excellent basis for a discussion of
employment arbitration.

IX. CONCLUSION

An arbitration revolution has taken place in recent years that has dramatically
reshaped the law and practice of contracting, and the resolution of disputes between parties
to contracts. Almost any type of agreement may call for arbitration of disputes, and such
provisions are the usual practice in franchise, securities, employment, consumer, maritime,
construction, and many other classes of contracts. While arbitration is present throughout
our economy, it is largely absent from the course in contracts required of every first year law
student. This article has sought to demonstrate the importance of arbitration; examined
what little is presently taught about arbitration through an examination of the casebooks
used to teach contracts; and offered concrete suggestions to remedy the absence of
arbitration in contracts courses.
X. APPENDIX: THE CASEBOOKS

The number of published contracts casebooks is large; twenty-three of them are
discussed below. Texts, hornbooks, and collections of readings are not considered. The
primary focus is on the latest edition of each casebook, but earlier editions are compared in
several instances. Casebooks are referred to by the name of the first named author, and are
presented in alphabetical order. Discussion of the leading cases is quite limited, because they
have been examined already. Other cases and topics selected by the casebook authors are
considered, sometimes at length. Casebook page references are indicated in parenthesis.
The length and depth of the discussion of casebooks varies considerably. In general,
the more a casebook has to say about arbitration, the more there is to examine and critique.
For the worst sinners – the casebooks that offer little if any coverage of arbitration – there is
little to say. Yours author clearly thinks this approach is serious misguided, but there is little
point in repeating that conclusion again and again.
My general methodology was to examine the Index, Table of Contents, and Table of
Cases (both initially and again after the leading cases were identified). No doubt, there are a
few casual references to arbitration buried in note material that escaped my attention.
Because the use of arbitration has become so widespread, it might receive mention under
almost any topic. An example from the Knapp casebook will illustrate the problem. One of
the notes after a third party beneficiary case discusses the defenses available to the promisor.
In the midst of the paragraph there is a single sentence about arbitration, which states that a
person making a claim as a third party beneficiary is subject to an arbitration provision in
the contract, and cites two cases to that effect. (716)

1. Randy E. Barnett, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE (2d ed. 1999).

This casebook has little to say about arbitration. In a discussion of contracting around
default damages rules, Barnett devotes one sentence to the availability of ADR, including
arbitration, to settle disputes. (170) A section titled "Punitive Damages and Arbitration
Clauses" uses Garrity as the main case., but without indicating that it presents a minority
rule, or that it is of only modest impact today due to federal preemption of state law related
to arbitration. (188) A contrary Alabama district court decision is excerpted at length.169
(197) Finally, Barnett includes an extensive excerpt from an article about arbitration in the
diamond industry.170

2. Gerald E. Berendt, Michael L. Closen, Doris E. Long, Marie A. Monahan, Robert
J. Nye & John H. Scheid, CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE (1st ed. 1998).

The common theme among the Berendt authors is that they all teach at The John
Marshall Law School. [One of the authors, Michael L. Closen, was the senior author of a
prior casebook, which is discussed below.] There is no Index, but Berendt does include a
detailed Table of Contents and a Table of Cases. None of the leading arbitration cases are
mentioned, let alone discussed.
The only consideration of arbitration is found in a short section under the topic of
equitable remedies, titled “arbitration awards directing contract performance.” (1252) Two
cases from the New York Court of Appeals are used, Grayson-Robinson and Sprinzen.171
Each decision confirmed an arbitration award that granted specific relief. Note material at
the end of the section cites to the UAA and FAA, and the holding of Allied-Bruce is stated.172

3. Brian A. Blum & Amy C. Bushaw, CONTRACTS: CASES, DISCUSSION, AND
PROBLEMS (1ST ed. 2003)

Arbitration is first introduced in the 2-207 context, with a truncated version of Klocek
that includes the discussion of Hill. (154) Unexpectedly, there is an employment arbitration
case in the materials on duress, Quigley v. KPMG.173 In response to KPMG’s motion to
compel arbitration, Quigley claimed duress because his manager said had told him: “If you
don’t sign this, you don’t work here any more.” The court ruled that the need to retain a job
does not constitute duress.

Quigley has one interesting feature that may account for its inclusion in the Blum
casebook. In two arbitration agreements, the name signed was “Joseph U.D. Quigley.” The
U.D. stands for “under duress,” but Quigley did not inform his KPMG supervisor of this
fact, so KPMG was unaware of the objection. This situation nicely illustrates the objective
approach to contracts – what counts is expressed intention not actual (but secret)
intention.174
Two arbitration cases compose a subsection titled relief for unconscionability.
Brower is given a remedial focus. The court found the ICC arbitration approach to be
unconscionable, and sent the case back to the trial court for substitution of another
arbitrator, as provided in the FAA. Brower is followed by Sosa v. Paulos, in which the
underlying dispute was a malpractice action by a patient against a physician.175 [The use of
arbitration provisions in contracts for medical and legal services is increasingly common.]
The patient signed several forms, including a separate arbitration agreement, while already
in “pre-op” – about one hour prior to surgery.
In my view, any agreement signed under such circumstances should be ruled invalid
on the basis of temporary incapacity. A claim of temporary incapacity requires that the

incapacity is known to the other party. Even if the test is actual knowledge of incapacity
(rather than the lower standard of reasonably should have known), both the physician and
hospital clearly satisfy this standard. Incapacity was not considered by the Sosa court, which
instead reached the same result on the more conventional basis of unconscionability.
A matter of interest, albeit only briefly considered by the Sosa court, was the
composition of the arbitration panel. The contract called for three arbitrators, all of whom
must be board-certified orthopedic surgeons. Quite apart from the potential costs associated
with such a proceeding, and the difficulty of locating three qualifying arbitrators whose
schedule would permit them to conduct an arbitration in Utah, this structure arguably is
inherently biased against patients. This issue was not addressed by the court or by Blum.

4. Steven J. Burton, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (2d ed. 2001).
Most of a section on form contracts is devoted to arbitration.
Burton begins soundly by informing students that arbitration provisions are included in
contracts with “dramatically increasing frequency,” and quoting a standard arbitration
provision. (264)
The major provisions of the FAA are introduced, and Burton provides a summary of the
central characteristics of arbitration. The “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitration”
is noted.
The goal of the remaining material is to “explore contract law’s capacity to policy
unjust arbitral agreements notwithstanding the strong policy in favor of arbitration.” As
there is a separate section on unconscionability, more space might be given to other
arbitration issues, such a federal preemption of state law and the separability doctrine.
Hill is cited in the materials on contract formation. Burton asks whether the buyer
was bound by Gateway’s limited warranty, without any mention of arbitration.

5. John D. Calamari, Joseph M. Perillo, & Helen H. Bender, CASES AND
PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 2000).

The Index does not mention arbitration. The only arbitration case listed in the Table
of Cases is Garrity (678), which is found in a section on punitive damages. While Garrity is a
main case, the majority opinion is reduced to less than one page, and the dissenting opinion is
omitted entirely.176 Nothing is said about arbitration in the offer and acceptance materials.
Judge Easterbrook’s views are presented through the Zeidenberg case, but there is not so
much as a citation to Hill.

6.
Michael L. Closen, Richard M. Perlmutter & Jeffrey D. Wittenberg,
CONTRACTS: CONTEMPORARY CASES, COMMENTS, AND PROBLEMS (3d ed.
1992).
This casebook will receive only brief consideration because it is dated, and its senior
author is among the authors of a more recent contracts casebook.177 This book has no Index
whatsoever, and it lacks the detailed Table of Contents that is a standard feature of contracts
(and other law school) casebooks. The short form Table of Contents does not include
arbitration among the topics.
The only identifiable arbitration case is Grayson-Robinson, which is summarized
briefly in the context of specific performance. (531) The central point is not about
arbitration, but rather that equity provides courts with broad discretion to order specific
performance of construction contracts, as it also allows courts to refuse to issue such an
order.

7. Thomas D. Crandall & Douglas J. Whaley, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999).

Arbitration is not an entry in the Index or the Table of Contents. The only leading
case to appear in the text (but not the Table of Cases) is Itoh, and the focus is entirely on the
2-207 issues rather than arbitration. (112) A problem does raise the question of whether an
arbitration provision is a “material alteration” under 2-207(2)(b). (122) Nothing else is said
about arbitration.

8. John P. Dawson, William B. Harvey & Stanley D. Henderson, CONTRACTS:
CASES AND COMMENTS (8th ed. 2003).

Consideration of arbitration is sprinkled through the Dawson casebook. A comment
on arbitration reads like it was written years ago. The dates of the cited cases are 1859, 1976,
1979, and 1980. Garrity is among these, but with no indication that the New York position is
atypical. A one sentence paragraph has been appended to the end of the note, citing
Mastrobuono for the proposition that there is a “division of views” regarding the power of
parties to authorize arbitrators to award punitive damages.178
The chapter on making of agreements uses Hill as a note case after Zeidenberg. (435)
The Broemmer decision (medical services) is used in the section on assent to standardized

forms.179 (531) Brower appears in the unconscionability materials. It is followed by a
comment on “contemporary unconscionability” that makes no mention of arbitration.
In the context of express conditions, arbitration is used to explain the distinction
between promises and conditions, with two illustrations from the Restatement. (719) A
provision that calls for disputes to be submitted to arbitration is a promise to arbitrate, but
does not make an award a condition precedent to the insurer’s obligation to pay. By way of
contrast, if the agreement states that a loss shall not be payable until 60 days after an award
then an award is a condition of the insurer’s obligation to pay.180

9. David G. Epstein, Bruce A. Markell, & Lawrence Ponoroff, MAKING AND
DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT (1st ed. 2002).

The Epstein casebook opens with the Hill case, including a full quotation of the
arbitration provision. (5) The primary focus in Hill is offer and acceptance rather than the
arbitration aspect of the case, which is the right approach for the first week of law school. At
the same time, students learn immediately that arbitration is important – not because anyone
says so, but because it is there. Epstein asks why the Hills do not want to settle their dispute
through arbitration. (Chicago and the ICC Rules are easily explained, leaving the core
matter of litigation v. arbitration.) The 2-207 discussion in Hill is omitted initially, but raised
later with the Klocek decision. (163)
Two employment arbitration decisions are presented in the materials on
unconscionability. One is the well known Hooters case – but the district court rather than the
court of appeals version.181 The other decision is also from a district court.182 I would use
the 4th circuit Hooters decision in lieu of the two opinions presented by Epstein, and utilize
the space saved for textual material about arbitration.

10. E. Allan Farnsworth, William E. Young, & Carol Sanger, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (6th ed. 2001).
Farnsworth provides the most comprehensive Index among the contracts casebooks
(21 double column pages), but it actually understates the coverage of arbitration.183 The
opening chapter includes an excellent two page comment about arbitration. (19-21) It
introduces the leading institutions in the field – AAA, ICC and UNCITRAL – and informs
the student that there are federal and state arbitration statutes. The standard form AAA
commercial arbitration term is quoted.
Arbitration receives repeated mention in the materials on the battle of the forms and
electronic contracting. (194-223) The material alteration issue under 2-207(2)(b) is explained
through the somewhat dated Dorton decision, and ensuing note material.184 (197) Itoh is used
as well. (210)
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The Statute of Frauds material include a brief arbitration decision.185 (279) The
expiration date of a written contract with an arbitration provision was orally extended. The
initial writing was sufficient to satisfy the writing requirement, and thus the arbitration term
was enforced. Students learn that this “passing through” approach has “substantial support
in general contract law.” (280)
The materials on adhesion contracts deal with arbitration in several places. The cases
include Graham (377) and Armendariz. (416) Farnsworth notes that courts sometimes order
arbitration after the removal of a limitation on the recovery of damages or other
unconscionable provision, although the Armendariz court refused to do so. Several of the
arbitration decisions considered previously are revisited: Graham (422), Brower (423), and
Klocek (423).
Farnsworth raises a major contract law problem under the name of “add-on
arbitration agreements.” (397) A banking organization or employer proposes to modify the
existing contract to add an arbitration term, with the customer/employee being offered the
option of accepting the change or terminating the relationship. The casebook then asks the
student to consider the modification of a contract between customer and securities broker
that requires arbitration, plus several variants on this theme. Unfortunately, the question
misleads because it fails to inform the student that arbitration has been a universal feature of
customer-broker form contracts since the early 1990s.
A variety of remedial issues in arbitration are discussed. Arbitration is impacted by
the law relating to specific relief in two contexts. When a court orders the arbitration of a
dispute, it is mandating specific performance. (20) Grayson-Robinson is used to show that
arbitrators sometimes may order specific relief where a court would not do so. (465) The
award of punitive damages by arbitrators also is considered. Garrity is mentioned (noting
that it was a 4-3 decision), followed by the accurate observation that most courts have
rejected the Garrity approach. The impact of Mastrobuono as a limitation on Garrity also is
stated. In the questions after a court decision that refused to enforce a liquidated damages
term based on gross sales, Farnsworth asks whether a court should confirm an arbitration
award that enforced the same liquidated damages term.186 (551)
All of this (and there is more) is simply wonderful. Not only does Farnsworth provide
extensive coverage of arbitration doctrine and practice, the casebook teaches students that
arbitration is a central feature of modern business law and practice. It might be though
churlish to ask for more, but two additions might be suggested: some coverage of the
separability doctrine, and an introduction to the main features of the FAA, UAA, and
RUAA.

11. Lon L. Fuller & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (7th ed.
2001)
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Neither the Index nor the Table of Contents contain any entry related to arbitration.
Hill appears as a note case in the contract formation materials. This is the only mention of
arbitration in the entire casebook.
The absence of any discussion of arbitration is a particularly striking omission in view
of Professor Fuller's writing about arbitration.187 Indeed, Fuller's original 1947 edition of
this casebook presented a typical arbitration award, followed by a comment on The Role of
Lawyers in Commercial Arbitration (711-713). In addition, the General Conditions of the
Contract for the Construction of Buildings published by the American Institute of Architects
(AIA), including the role of the Architect and the arbitration of disputes, were quoted at
length (807-809).
The Supplement designed for use with this casebook includes four important and
detailed form contracts. Astonishingly, each of them calls for arbitration of subsequent
disputes.188 The total disconnect between the contents of the casebook and the known reality
of modern dispute settlement practice is striking.

12. Robert W. Hamilton, Alan S. Rau & Russell J. Weintraub, CONTRACTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1992).

This casebook does not consider arbitration at all. This is quite surprising because
Alan Rau is a noted arbitration scholar and the author of a leading ADR casebook,189 and
Russell Weintraub has also written about arbitration.190

13. Fredrich Kessler, Grant Gilmore & Anthony T. Kronman, CONTRACTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986).
There is no entry for arbitration in the Index. The material on remedies includes a
section on limitation of remedies, with arbitration being one of the topics. (1210-1223) The
main case is Garrity, but students are not informed that the New York view is a clear
minority position. The notes focus on Aimcee Wholesale, (1221), which rules that antitrust
allegations present public policy issues that are not subject to arbitration.191 (1221) This is
not the law today.192 Securities claims are said not to be arbitrable, citing Wilko v. Swan,
which decision was overruled by the Supreme Court after publication of the Kessler
casebook.193 Brief mention is made of the FAA.

14. Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal & Harry G. Prince, PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW (5th ed. 2003).
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This casebook will receive closer attention than most, with some comparison to the
prior editions, because this is the casebook from which I have taught Contracts for the last
decade. It also is interesting to determine the extent to which the greatly increased recent
importance of arbitration noted by Professor Knapp in his writing is reflected in his
casebook.194 [The other two authors, of course, share joint and several responsibility with
Knapp for their final work product.]195 Until the 2003 edition, the Knapp casebook included
hardly any coverage of arbitration.
The 1993 edition of this casebook was limited to a three page section at the very end of
the book, titled Commercial Arbitration. (1131-1134) This material was repeated in the 4th
edition, again at the end. (1203-1206) The materiality, vel non, of arbitration provisions in
the context of the battle of the forms and UCC, § 2-207 received brief mention. (317) The
one major addition in the 4th edition was the opening case in the book, an absurdly long and
complicated arbitration case from an Alabama trial court – twenty pages of material,
including comments and a Problem).196 (18-38) Why the authors selected this admittedly
"complicated case with many different legal issues" (28) decided by an obscure trial court
from the jurisdiction with the most bizarre arbitration jurisprudence in America is quite
beyond me. This material is too difficult, and requires too much background, to use at the
start of an upper-division Arbitration course, let alone for the first week of the first year of
law school. I omitted Rollins entirely, and substituted other arbitration material later in the
course.
Arbitration receives dramatically increased attention in the 5th edition, most of it
ranging from critical to hostile. Again, the opening case is about arbitration. Rollins is
replaced by Burch, a “considerably less complex” unconscionability decision from the
Supreme Court of Nevada.
The note material after Burch provides background about arbitration. The FAA is
introduced, as is the preemption of inconsistent state law, and state arbitration statutes are
mentioned. The focus is on disadvantages of arbitration; these include expense, procedural
limitations (discovery, rules of evidence), no jury trials, lesser relief, no class actions, and the
absence of judicial review. The nicest thing Knapp can say about arbitration is that it is “not
necessarily an unfair ... method of dispute resolution.” (21)
Hill (255) and Klocek (259) are used to illustrate electronic contracting. The question
of whether arbitration is a material alteration for purposes of 2-207 is raised, and the
casebook notes that the cases go both ways.
The attempt to avoid arbitration based on unconscionability is raised again through a
pair of employment cases: Cooper and Adkins.197 Adkins enforced the pre-dispute
arbitration term, while Cooper held it to be unconscionable. Adkins rejects all the
arguments against arbitration, and closes by observing:
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Adkins’ claim amounts to little more than an attempt to undermine repeated
pronouncements by Congress and the Supreme Court that federal law incorporate a
liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements. A refusal on our part to heed these
pronouncements would be a dereliction of our duty under the law. (506-507)
The Cooper approach was rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its Martindale
decision.198 The dissenting opinion by Justice Stein, which relied on Cooper had the integrity
to admit that decisions such as Cooper are manipulating contract doctrine to achieve a
desired result – one which Stein supports: “In my view, public policy requires this Court to
invalidate a mandatory arbitration agreement ... that a prospective employee is forced to sign
as a condition of being considered for a job.”199
The subsequent note material cites five cases where the court found the arbitrtation
provision to be unconscionabile, plus a citation to an article by Knapp the provides citations
to additional cases, and only one contrary decision.200 Finally, Knapp quotes at length from
an article hostile to arbitration by my colleague Richard Alderman.201 The discussion of
arbitration in Knapp is seriously unbalanced. All five of the main arbitration cases involve
consumer or employment arbitration, and three of them address unconscionability.
The world of commercial arbitration – not to put too fine a point on it, the world of
clients who can afford to hire lawyers – goes all but unmentioned until a three page
commentary at the very end of the casebook that concisely offers much useful information
about commercial arbitration, including careful attention to the AAA arbitration
procedures. (1003) At last, there turns out to be a reason for the use of arbitration:
complaints have long “raged about the slowness and expense of the judicial process.”
Compared to consumer and employment arbitration, there are “fundamental differences”
where two sophisticated parties square off. However, no explanation is offered about why
power imbalances matter more in arbitration than in litigation. By itself, the fact that
powerful parties have advantages over weaker parties in arbitration as well as litigation is
about as shocking as the discovery that there was gambling going on at Rick’s Place (in
Casablanca).202

15. Stewart Macauley, John Kidwell & William Whitford, CONTRACTS IN
ACTION (2d ed. 2003).

This casebook is the product of The Wisconsin Contracts Group. The first precursor
was created decades ago as a Supplement to the Kessler casebook, then with Malcolm P.
Sharp of the University of Chicago Law School as the coauthor. [Your author was
introduced to Contracts by Professor Sharp, using his casebook and the Macauley
Supplement.] Later, the Wisconsin materials served as a Supplement to the Macneil
casebook. Long in use at the University of Wisconsin, and at several other law schools, these
materials were not formally published until 1995.
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The new edition of Macauley raised high expectations. After all, a work that puts
“Law in Action” into its title ought to reflect the exploding importance of arbitration. The
Preface confirms this to be the case. In addition to more minor changes in the new edition of
the casebook:
“the major effort has been devoted to bringing up to date our materials on such
matters as unconscionability, form contracts printed in fine print or hidden in other
ways (particularly in the area of computer programs), and the growing uses of
arbitration to repeal the reform statutes of earlier decades.”
This statement evidences agreement with the views of Professor Knapp (and many others in
legal education): arbitration has become very important, and this is a baleful development.
Macauley is a two volume work of almost 1,500 pages.203 The overall length is not
quite as daunting as might initially appear, because Macauley provides students with a great
deal of textual materials that explains how deals and dealing are conducted in contemporary
America. In effect, this is a casebook together with a book of supplementary readings.204
Arbitration is introduced in the context of the resolution of grievances under
collective bargaining agreements (CBA). Most contracts casebooks do not consider CBAs,
leaving them for a course on labor law, but including them as an important form of
contracting is certainly a justifiable approach. The grievance materials appear in a subchapter titled Franchise and Employment Relations. The lengthy section about franchising
says nothing about arbitration, although modern franchise agreements nearly always include
arbitration provisions.
The TWA decision is used to illustrate an arbitration award. (428) The idea is sound,
but surely a more recent award can be found, that deals with a more contemporary topic
than the “grooming and appearance” of a stewardesses who was stationed at an airport
called Idlewild and employed by a now defunct airline named Trans World.
Arbitration is directly considered in a section on commercial relationships and private
government. (495-508) After an overview, a critique is provided, from a 1980 article, which
concludes that arbitration is problematic in commercial disputes; where consent is lacking
“arbitration becomes ineffective and resort to the courts is almost inevitable.” 205 (497). This
statement is inaccurate, if for no other reason than because courts are strongly supportive of
arbitration, and resort to the courts to avoid arbitration is usually a waste of time and
money. On the other hand, arbitration is said to be useful for consumer and workplace
disputes: “By dispensing with numerous procedural requirements, discovery, and even the
need for counsel, arbitration can provide a quick and inexpensive resolution of small
disputes.” Recent arguments against arbitration, including those of the Macauley authors in
their Preface, suggest that arbitration is worrisome in disputes between parties with unequal
bargaining power. Apparently, old material was recycled without consideration of its
contents.
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Macauley informs students that the U.S. Supreme Court “has read” the FAA “as
evidencing” a strong pro-arbitration policy; that the FAA preempts state law; that Courts
“routinely” enforce boilerplate arbitration provisions in contracts, and that judicial review
of arbitral awards is quite limited. (497) The Casarotto decision is a main case.206 (499)
Next comes a series of New York arbitration decisions that are interesting for students
of arbitration, but too much detail for a contracts course. These cases, which include
Grayson-Robinson and Garrity, are now dated (the latest one was decided in 1976).
Macualey does note that many courts reject the prohibition on arbitrators awarding punitive
damages. If New York law is to be explicated, the text should make reference to the
Sacharow decision, in which New York followed Mastrobuono.207
Hill is among the cases used to illustrate contract formation in the modern world.
(638) A note refers the student forward to Brower and the unconscionability materials. Also
discussed is the Supreme Court’s Shute decision that enforced choice of forum clauses in
form contracts between businesses and consumers.208 (641)
The unconscionability material offers textual material critical of consumer
arbitration, and the Brower decision. (721) The notes discuss subsequent Gateway’s shifting
arbitration practices, and the AAA Consumer Due Process Protocol.
Among its
requirements are that consumers be entitled to proceed in small claims courts. The ceiling is
$5,000 in many states, including Wisconsin and Texas. Macauley notes that in small claims
proceedings, the losing party is afforded an “opportunity” to obtain a de novo trial. This is
more an opportunity for the merchant than the consumer, because the cost of this
“opportunity” is prohibitive. Obtaining a prompt and final decision, as is provided by
arbitration, is at least arguably better for moderate income consumers than a “right” of
appeal to a court of record – where, unlike in small claims, retaining a lawyer is necessary.
The vehicle for considering employment arbitration is Ramirez, where a mid-level
California appellate court found the arbitration provision to be unconscionable and
therefore denied enforcement.209 (728) The subsequent notes begin with a bold print
quotation: “The Supreme Court has created a monster.”210 Several other California cases
are briefly considered, notably Armendariz and Adams, both of which declined to enforce
arbitration provisions due to unconscionability.211
Macauley notes one of the numerous efforts to enact federal legislation that would
make it an unfair and deceptive trade practice to include an arbitration provision in
consumer and employment contracts. So far, none of the proposed arbitration bills have
even gotten as far as being approved by a Committee in either house of Congress. The only
“consumer” proposal that seems to have even a modicum of support is one to protect
automobile dealers from being required to arbitrate disputes with manufacturers.
Volume II is largely devoted to contract performance and the adjustment of on-going
relationships, as opposed to formation or picking up the pieces when deals fall apart. Even
where it is clear that parties have reached an agreement, there may still be disagreements
about the terms of that agreement, because the terms are reflected in multiple documents
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exchanged by the parties during the contracting process. Reflecting the importance of this
approach to contracting, Macauley devotes seventy-five pages to a section titled Business
Documents and Forming Contracts. (157) In the context of the battle of the forms, and the
mysteries of UCC sec. 2-207, the authors use arbitration as an example, with the Itoh case.
(214) The New York position that arbitration is material as a matter of law is noted, as is the
alternative view.
All in all, Macualey offers readers a wide ranging and high quality introduction to
arbitration doctrine and practice. Some of the material is out of date, and some important
recent developments go unmentioned, notably the RUAA. In view of the concerns about the
fairness of arbitration for consumers, the allocation of the costs of arbitration might have
been discussed.

16. Ian R. Macneil & Paul J. Gudel, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS
AND RELATIONS (3d ed. 2001).

This revision of Professor Macneil’s groundbreaking casebook is almost entirely the
work of Professor Gudel.212 The approach of the casebook is atypically broad for a contracts
casebook: “The fundamental assumption is that contract encompasses all human activities in
which economic exchange is a significant factor. ...” (v) Macneil includes far and away the
most material related to arbitration of any contracts casebook – 140 pages! In undertaking
this project, I did not expect find a casebook that devotes too much space to arbitration, but
this one does so. More important, the pages are not put to effective use – largely because the
materials selected are hardly edited.
Macneil, with its emphasis on continuing relations, devotes considerable attention to
the settlement of disputes in the labor-management context, in which process arbitration is
the last (and infrequently invoked) step. [Apart from Macauley, the contracts casebooks give
little attention to this topic.] The grievance arbitration materials are badly dated. (261-277)
The two cases presented are TWA (1965), and Warrior & Gulf.213 (268) These two decisions
consume thirteen pages that could be better used for more recent decisions, or textual
matter.
The materials on commercial arbitration are unduly long (1066-1181), yet they do not
present a coherent picture of the topic to students. A brief and useful historical introduction
is followed by material on enforcing arbitral awards. Grayson-Robinson, is used to illustrate
the broad remedial powers of arbitrators. The Raytheorn case holds that arbitrators may
award punitive damages, while expressly rejecting the Garrity approach.214 (1078) So far so
good; if the authors had just added some text about how limited are the grounds for vacating
an arbitration award, perhaps quoting section 10 of the FAA, the material on arbitration
remedies would be a success. Instead they turn to AMD v. Intel, which consumes twentyfour casebook pages.215 (1085) Subsequently, there is more material on judicial review of
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arbitration awards, notably the Perini decision, which consumes another 22 pages.216 (1147)
Perini was rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court just two years later.217
Several other important arbitration cases are reproduced at length: Mitsubishi
consumes twenty pages (1127); and Merit Insurance uses up ten more pages (1168).218 Both
are important decisions by high level courts, but at a minimum these decisions should be
heavily edited. First Options clearly and concisely covers federal preemption of state law
that is inconsistent with the pro-arbitration approach of the FAA, while also providing an
introduction to the important subject of securities arbitration.219 (1109) The casebook also
uses Itoh in the battle of the forms material. (927)
Macneil closes with a short section on arbitration planning. Choice of law provisions
are discussed, with citation to and brief consideration of the leading Supreme Court
decisions. The standard form AIA arbitration provisions are discussed along with the AAA
Construction Arbitration Rules.220 These tasks are accomplished in under four pages; the
authors should have adopted a similar approach with arbitration remedies materials.
The dichotomy of commercial (including consumer) and labor arbitration results in
the omission of the important topic of employment arbitration. As the union sector of the
economy continues to shrink, and arbitration provisions are becoming a standard feature of
employment contracts, employment is rapidly becoming the most important type of
workplace arbitration – but without the power symmetry that one finds in the labormanagement context. This difference, plus the inapplicability of the Labor-Management
Relations Act outside the union context, suggests that consumer arbitration might provide a
closer analogy than labor arbitration.

17. William McGovern, Lary Lawrence, & Bryan D. Hill, CONTRACTS AND
SALES: CONTEMPORARY CASES AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 2002).

Arbitration is barely mentioned in this “contemporary” casebook. The Hill and
Klocek decisions are cited after Zeidenberg, after a computer purchase problem that is based
on these two cases. (88)
Graham is a main case in a section on Adhesion Contracts and Unconscionability, and
Armendariz is noted. [All three authors teach at California law schools.] A brief comment
after Graham sets forth disadvantages of arbitration, specifically high arbitrator costs and
lack of formal discovery. Pointing to these factors as weaknesses immediately after Graham
is strange because the AFM process was provided without charge, and the absence of
discovery facilitated rapid, inexpensive resolution of the dispute without any loss of relevant
information. To the extent that Graham teaches students that unconscionability is a viable
theory in agreements between merchants, they are badly misled.221
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18. Edward J. Murphy, Richard E. Speidel & Ian Ayres, STUDIES IN CONTRACT
LAW (6th ed. 2003).

The second listed author of this casebook, Professor Richard Speidel, is a coauthor of
the leading treatise on arbitration, so one would expect that the arbitration material would
be lengthy and excellent.222 The Murphy casebook gives dramatically increased the attention
to arbitration compared to the 5th edition (1997), which devoted only limited attention to
arbitration – at the end of the casebook in the chapter on remedies. A brief look at the 5th
edition coverage of arbitration offers a striking contrast to the 6th edition material.
The first mention of arbitration in the 1997 edition was toward the end of the
casebook, in the materials on remedies. A chart set forth the characteristics of the primary
methods of dispute resolution, including arbitration. (1019) A useful section on dispute
resolution in construction contracts addressed the use of standardized AIA form contracts
for most (private) construction projects, with particular attention to the consequences when
the architect refuse to issue a certificate of completion – as happened in the famous case of
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent. (1021) A standard AIA arbitration provision was quoted, which
specified that disputed would be subject to arbitration under the AAA’s Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules. (1028) Subsequent textual material set out the basic
characteristics of arbitration.223 The text of the UAA was reproduced but the FAA, which
preempts the UAA in almost all instances, went unmentioned. (1028) The 6th edition, by
contrast, reflects a quantum leap in arbitration coverage.
The discussion of arbitration begins badly with the Textile Unlimited case, a poorly
reasoned decision that is representative, if anything, of the 9th Circuit’s lonely position of
hostility to arbitration among the federal courts of appeals.224 (336) Textile was explicitly
rejected in the only subsequent reported case on point.225 Textile discusses venue, a topic
more appropriate for civil procedure, before turning to an incomplete discussion of the battle
of the forms and UCC, sec. 2-207. The notes after Textile Unlimited cite an unreported
district court decision for the proposition that an arbitration term is not material under 2207(2) in the context of extensive prior dealings between the parties.226
The authors do make two important points about arbitration and the battle of the
forms. (340) First, the arbitration term in Textile would be enforced under the CISG. The
“last shot doctrine” has much more of a place in international contracts than under
American law (Judge Easterbrook notwithstanding). Second, the revised version of 2-207
adopts the knockout rule and eliminates the incorporation of unbargained for terms.
The Hill (342) and Klocek (345) decisions are used, followed by two problems for
students to consider – one a conventional battle of the forms purchase, and the other a
telephone purchase of a computer. Both contracts call for arbitration in New York City
under the ICC Arbitration Rules.
The main case is a section titled Electronic Commerce, is the Specht decision.227 (349)
The customer was invited to download software, with additional contract terms being
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obtainable by scrolling down the page beyond the send/buy (or similarly named) button.
These terms came too late, said the 2d Circuit, and thus did not become part of the contract.
The impact of this seemingly important decision will be modest, because merchant sellers can
so easily avoid its impact. The moral for sellers is a simple one: place the contract terms
above instead of below the send button. Judicial discussion of topics like “the reasonably
prudent offeree of downloadable software” are likely to be foolish, and certainly will be
quickly dated. Still, Specht is a useful case because it requires students (and teachers) to
grapple with offer and acceptance issues in a modern context, instead of days of yore when
the mails were the main means of business communication.
Arbitration makes its next appearance in the materials on capacity to contract in the
CitiFinancial decision, an unreported case that was reversed on appeal.228 With all the cases
to choose from, why select any unreported case from a trial court, let alone one that was
reversed on appeal? [Due to the lag time associated with preparing a casebook, the reversal
probably came after the materials were set in print, and it was too late to do anything more
than cite to the subsequent decision.] The defense to the bank’s motion to compel arbitration
was that the customer lacked capacity to contract. The trial court considered (and accepted)
this defense, although CitiFinancial argued that the capacity question should be decided in
arbitration.
In terms of doctrine, the question was whether the separability doctrine, which I
argue is the most important single arbitration topic for purposes of contract law, extends to
capacity to contract – and, if so, whether minority and mental incapacity should be treated in
the same manner. (Infants will become adults in the normal course of events, but John
Brown will never gain competence to contract.) The 5th Circuit applied Prima Paint, and
reversed the trial court, ruling that the dispute, including the capacity issue, should be
decided in arbitration. There is a division of authority on the topic.229
A chapter devoted to alternatives to courts for the settlement of contract disputes
includes an informative 27 page section on arbitration (1050). These materials open with a
discussion of the role of the architect in standard form construction contracts. While the
architect is not an arbitrator with regard to most issues, and the AIA contracts specify
arbitration pursuant to the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, there is a useful
analogy between the limited review of arbitration awards and the limited review for many
decisions by the architect. The same is true for appraisers, and various others who are
appointed to make specific determinations. Essentially, an honest judgment will be upheld,
and proving the contrary is extremely difficult in practice.
The Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) offers another example of dispute
resolution that is not arbitration but is similar thereto. This matter is explored via the Parisi
decision, which nicely explains the domain name dispute resolution system.230 (1055)
Then the separability doctrine is considered – for the second time, with no reference
to the earlier discussion in the capacity section.231 Without any introduction, Murphy offers
up a deeply edited version (two pages) of the Michael-Curry decision.232 Michael-Curry is
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the oddest possible case to illustrate the separability doctrine (the term does not appear in
the opinion) because Minnesota is the only state with an established body of case law that
rejects the separability doctrine. Michael-Curry, in which the court orders arbitration, is an
exception to the general Minnesota rule that an assertion of fraud in the inducement puts the
“making” of the entire contract claim at issue, including the arbitration term, and “that issue
is more properly determined by those trained in the law.”233
The final case is Brook, where the losing party in an arbitration proceeding
challenged the award because the appointment process was considerably at variance with the
process called for by contract.234 [Even worse, this was an administered arbitration, with the
AAA being the administering body.] Nevertheless, the award was confirmed because Brook
waived his claim failed to object in a timely manner (at the start of the arbitration
proceeding).
The extremely limited place for judicial review of arbitration awards is further
elucidated in the note materials that follow Brook, with an introduction to the statutory basis
of review (FAA, sec. 10), and a nonstatutory ground recognized by many (but not all) courts:
manifest disregard of the law. [The other recognized nonstatutory ground for vacatur, the
award is contrary to public policy, is not discussed.] The RUAA is introduced (1066, 1076),
as is the preemptive role of the FAA on state law related to arbitration. Finally, the question
of whether the parties can expand the scope of judicial review beyond that provided for in
the FAA is raised, with a citation to the LaPine decision.235

19. John E. Murray, Jr., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2001).
Murray seeks to be up to date, making a point in the Preface about coverage of the
CISG, revised UCC Article 2, and electronic contracting. (iii) Arbitration apparently does
not qualify. The Index does not include an entry for arbitration, and there is no mention of
the topic in the Table of Contents. The Table of Cases includes two of the commonly used
arbitration cases. Itoh (198) illustrates the battle of the forms; the subsequent comments are
devoted entirely to 2-207, and do not mention arbitration. Hill is a note case after
Zeidenberg. (232) The discussion is entirely about “rolling contracts,” and nothing is said
about arbitration.

20.
Arthur J. Rosett & Daniel J. Bussel, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS
APPLICATION (6th ed. 1999).

Rosett has a section on arbitration that presents the topic in an interesting context.
(240-256) Chapter 2 deals with contract remedies. Chapter 3 addresses Countervailing
Influences on Contract Remedies, and examines four “ways out of contract remedies”:
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restitution, tort, liquidated damages, and arbitration. Arbitration is a way out because the
parties “give power to a new set of tribunals which apply a distinct set of rules.” (169)
The arbitration materials open with Judge Jerome Frank’s often-quoted explication
of the legacy of judicial hostility to arbitration.236 Note material introduces the FAA, UAA,
and New York Convention. Next the authors present some dated materials that could be
omitted – a three page excerpt from a 1973 article about arbitration in long-term contractual
relationships, and an excerpt from an 1875 insurance case that discusses arbitration.
Two other arbitration decisions are presented. Sims raised a challenge to an arbitral
award by the Diamond Dealers Club (DDC).237 Although DDC procedures were inconsistent
with the New York arbitration act, this claim was waived by participation in the arbitration
proceeding without making a timely objection. The award was confirmed. LaPine addresses
the question of whether parties may by contract expand the scope of judicial review beyond
that specified in the FAA. 238 LaPine generated opinions from each of the three judges who
heard the case. That circumstance is a teacher’s delight; even Judge Kozinski (concurring)
confessed that “I find the question closer than most.” The tension between quite specific and
limited judicial review provisions in the statute, and the central place of freedom of contract
in arbitration is a useful context for considering limits on the power of contracting parties to
alter the judicial process.239

21. Robert E. Scott & Jody S. Kraus, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY (3d ed.
2002).

The concise Table of Contents does not mention arbitration. Hill is used on a section
titled Contract Formation in the Internet Age. (303) The notes after the case address
contract formation issues at length, but they do not discuss arbitration. No other arbitration
decision is listed in the Table of Cases. Arbitration goes unmentioned in the section on
unconscionabilty. The absence of any consideration of arbitration in this recently revised
casebook by such distinguished authors is surprising.

22. Robert S. Summers & Robert A, Hillman, CONTRACT AND RELATED
OBLIGATIONS: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 2001)

The remedies chapter closes with a short section about ADR. The importance of the
topic is suggested by its length (4+ pages) and placement (last). An overview of arbitration is
presented via a relatively lengthy excerpt (three pages) from a 1952 article by Soia
Mentschikoff. 240 Not only is the article badly dated, it is not even the best article on the topic
by Professor Mentschikoff.241 She does, however, rate a full page picture. (356)
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Hill is a main case in the Agreement Process chapter (530), but it is not listed under
arbitration in the Index. Arbitration does receive attention in the agreement process
materials, in a brief section on contract planning. It is suggested that a contract can specify
“some mode of dispute resolution, such as arbitration.”
Such explication as Summers provides for contract planning about arbitration is
through a somewhat unfortunately chosen form provision. The centrally important scope
provision is missing: “All disputes subject to arbitration under this Contract shall be
submitted to arbitration ....” Whatever the explanation for the omission of the subject
disputes, this is a serious error – all the more so in a section on drafting to avoid problems.
The standard AAA form provision (edited to omit the AAA as administering body, if desired)
would be far better.242

23. David H. Vernon, CONTRACTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1991).

Vernon includes two cases and one problem about arbitration, but the topic goes
unmentioned in the chapters on contract formation and remedies. Vernon does examine the
most important arbitration contract issues, separability. The vehicle is the Weinrott
decision, in which New York abandoned its former position of hostility to the separability
doctrine.243 Weinrott is also the source of the principle that a court may refuse to order
arbitration where fraud permeates the entire contract. A note after the case cites Southland
and Volt regarding the preemptive effect of the FAA.
The Glen-Rich case offers students an interesting illustration of the problems that can
(and often do) arise among owners, builders and subcontractors, and the role of the architect
in the construction process.244 All this takes place in the context of AIA standard forms,
which call for arbitration of most disputes. There is a cogent dissent by Judge Brietel, so
Glen-Rich is an excellent teaching tool.
Vernon focuses on problems, and presents fewer main cases or note material than
most casebooks. The only problem that involves arbitration, Problem 11-4, is found in the
chapter on third party beneficiaries. The problem is based on a provision in the rules for
NASD members that disputes between member firms and their customers subject to
arbitration must be arbitrated under the NASD Code of Arbitration. There was no
arbitration provision in the agreement between the customer and the firm. The customer
wants to compel arbitration of the dispute; the student is asked to devise a theory to achieve
this result. Presumably, the theory is that the customer is a third party beneficiary of the
agreement between the firm and NASD; the theory almost certainly would fail.
This problem demonstrates one of the difficulties with trying to stress current and
real world problems. All customer-broker agreements now mandate arbitration (and many
already did in 1991), so the very premise of the question is no longer valid. Indeed, to the
extent that the problem purports to inform about contemporary business and dispute
resolution reality, it misleads.
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Problem 11-5 involved the purchase of a house that was infested with termites, and an
insolvent seller. The issue was whether the buyer could successfully sue the licensed
inspector who did the pre-sale termite inspection for the buyer. No mention was made of the
fact that the form contracts used by termite and pest control firms typically provide for
arbitration of all disputes.245
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1. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). If
forced to identify a single date or event as the beginning of the modern arbitration revolution, I
would choose the Moses Cone decision.
2. The Supreme Court decisions are particularly favorable to arbitration in the international
context. See Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, Enforcement of International
Arbitration Agreements by American Courts, Yearbook on International Financial and Economic
Law 227 (Kluwer 1998).
3. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 846 (1961); Lisa Bernstein,
Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
Legal Stud. 115 (1992). NYSE since 1830s; The Andersons (Grain).
4. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
Fordham L. Rev. 761, 763 (2002).
5. My guess for the federal district courts is 250 decisions per year, in addition to those that result
in subsequent court of appeals decisions (with opinion).
6. Stephen K. Huber, Arbitration in The Fifth Circuit, -- Texas Tech. L. Rev. ___ (2004).
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7. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 123 S.Ct. 588 (2002); Pacific Health Systems, Inc. v. Book,
123 S.Ct. 1531 (2003); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003); Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. ___ (2003).
8. The volume of arbitration decisions is so massive that my general policy is to read only state
supreme court, federal court of appeals, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
9. For evidence in support for these conclusions, see the discussion of the individual casebooks in
the Appendix
10. 9 U.S.C. secs 1 et seq.
11. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
Fordham L. Rev. 761, 766 (2002).
0.10. In preparation for a presentation to my faculty colleagues several years ago about the new
arbitration law, I conducted an informal survey of law professors to determine what they had
learned about arbitration while in law school. With a very few exceptions, the answers ranged
from “little if anything” to “absolutely nothing,” and no one recalled learning anything about
arbitration in first year courses. The few exceptions learned something about arbitration in a labor
law or ADR course. Very recently, many law schools have started to offer arbitration courses.
13. Ian R. Macneil, Richard Speidel & Thomas Stipanowich, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW
(1994).
14. Lon Fuller died in 1986; the recent editions are entirely the work of Professor Melvin
Eisenberg, a highly esteemed scholar of contract law.
15. Steven J. Burton & Melvin A Eisenberg, CONTRACT LAW: SELECTED SOURCE
MATERIALS 561-601 (2003). The same form contracts have been used for several years. See
e.g., pp. 487-527 in the 2001 edition.
16. See e.g., Richard Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A
Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. Rev. 1237 (2001); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract
and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331; Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 761 (2002); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small
Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled
Arbitration, 1997 Wisc. L. Rev. 33; Richard E. Speidel, Brooklyn L. Rev. ; Jean R. Sternlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration,
74 Wash. U.L.Q. 637 (1996);
17. Thomas E. Carbonneau,
World Arb. & Med. Rep. (Aug. 2001). Professor Carbonneau
now teaches at the Dickinson College of Law (Pennsylvania State University).
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18. Professor Carbonneau finds it “difficult to believe” that this conclusion constitutes “an
accurate representation of pedagogical reality.
19. Jean R. Sternlight

J. Disp. Res.

( )

20. The discussion here is based on Laura J. Cooper, Teaching ADR in the Workplace Once And
Again: A Pedagogical History, 53 J. Legal Ed. 1 (2003).
21. Shortly after the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, a national no strikes, no lockouts
agreement was reached between labor and management. Within six months, the War Labor Board
had 1,000 part-time personnel engaged in mediation, fact finding, and arbitration. Dennis R.
Nolan & Roger Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years, 35 U. Fla. L. Rev. 557,
564-565 (1983).
22. Cooper, 53 L. Legal. Ed. at 25.
23. See Laura J. Cooper & Dennis R. Nolan, LABOR ARBITRATION: A COURSEBOOK 2324 (1994).
24. The lead authors of both editions are Laura J., Cooper and Dennis R. Nolan; the 2000 edition
added Richard A. Bales as a third co-author.
25. Cooper, 53 J. Legal Ed. at 31.
26. Samuel Estreicher & Michael C. Harper, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW (2000); and Michael J. Zimmer, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (2000).
27. The AALS Directory of Law School Teachers provides a listing of faculty who teach various
subject, but it proved unhelpful for present purposes. The AALS Directory lists Alternative
Dispute Resolution as a course topic, with the notation that it includes Arbitration, Mediation, and
Negotiation.
28. The Gateway approach to arbitration is discussed in part VI(D) of this article.
29. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
30. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 1332 (D.Kan. 2000).
31. C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int’l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977).
32. For a review of the issues, see James J. White & Robert Summers, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 5- 25 (4th ed. 1995).
33. The classic illustration is Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915).
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34. Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). Judge
Wisdom had a long and distinguished career serving on the 5th Circuit, but in this case he was
sitting with the 3d Circuit.
35. This circumstance provides a sufficient reason to make an exception to my strong preference
for higher court cases.
36. Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P.
Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962
37. The Farnsworth casebook is a notable exception.
38. Marlene Industries Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 239, 242 (N.Y. 1978)
39. Schubtex, Inc. v. Allen Snyder, Inc., 399 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (N.Y. 1979); Perval Industries,
Inc. v. TM Wallcovering, Inc., 871 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1989) In practice, the proof problems are
substantial. See Diskin v. J.P. Stevens & Cop., Inc., 836 F.2d 47, 51 (1st Cir. 1987); H & W
Industries, Inc. v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 911 F.2d 1118, 1122 (5th Cir. 1990).
40. See, e.g., Comark Merchandising, Inc. v. Highland Group, Inc., 932 F.2d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir.
1991).
41. Avedon Engineering, Inc. v. Seatex, 126 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 1997). Also at issue was a
provision requiring that arbitration take place within one year after the claim arose. This approach
consistent with U.C.C. 2-725, which provides for a four year statute of limitations but allows
parties to reduce the limitations period to one year. However, the Colorado version of 2-725
prohibits reduction of the four year limitations period.
42. FAA, secs. 2 and 3; UAA, sec. 1
43. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). Specht is used in the latest edition of the Murphy casebook to
illustrate electronic commerce.
44. Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J.Super. 1999).
45. “Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing up sales. If
the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales operations such as Gateway’s had to read the
four-page statement of terms before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice
would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers. Others would hang up in a rang
over the waste of their time. And oral recitations would not avoid customers’ assertions (whether
true or feigned) that the clerk did not read term X to them or that they did not remember or
understand it.” Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, ---- (7th Cir. 1997).
46. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1998).
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47. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
48. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000)
49. The separability doctrine is discussed in Part VIII(B)(2).
50. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
51. Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46
Hastings L.J. 459 (1995). The quoted phrases are from pages 460, 461 and 465 respectively.
52. Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 1064 (Cal. 2003).
53. In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001).
54. Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 1064, 1085 (Cal. 2003).
55. Brown v. Wheat First Securities, Inc., 257 F.3d 821 (D.C.Cir. 2001).
56. A variant found in particularly in medical claims contracts allows a de novo trial if the award
exceeds $X. See Benyon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal.App.3d 698; 161 Cal.Rptr 146
(1980); Saika v. Gold, 49 Cal.App.4th 1074, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 922 (1996).
57. Cole v. Burns International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C.Cir. 1994). Prior to his
appointment, Judge Edwards was a distinguished labor law professor and scholar, who was active
in workplace issues and ADR. See e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Panacea or Anathema?, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 668 (1986).
58. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
59. Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and
Proposals, 1451 U. Pa. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1992).
60. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
61. FAA, sec. 10(a)(2); UAA, sec. 12(a)(2). RUAA, sec. 22(a)(2).
62. Prince, at 501-502. For the discussion of Graham, see pp. 460, 502-512.
63. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 623 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y.
1993).
64. U.C.C., sec. 2-302, comment 2.
65. AAA case, The Andersons, subsequent decision.

-67-

66. See RUAA, sec. 23(a)(5). An award should can be vacated if “there was no agreement to
arbitrate, unless the person participating in the arbitration proceeding without raising the
objecction ... not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing.”
67. The choice of Chicago as the situs for arbitration was upheld on the basis of Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 595 (1991).
68. Reflecting the “loser pays” approach common outside the United States, the consumer would
have be responsible for Gateway’s legal fees if the claim failed, and vice-versa. Of course, this
risk is far more onerous for an individual than for a large business organization.
69. See discussion in section VI(D).
70. Susan Fitzgibbon, Teaching Unconscionability Through Agreements to Arbitrate Employment
Claims, 49 St. Louis U.L.J. 1401 (2000).
71. Id. at 1412, 1410.
72. Id. at 1412-1413.
73. Marika F.X. Litras, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Complaints
in U.S. District Courts, 1990-1998 (2000).
74. Id.
75. Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration: Is It Really Second Class Justice?, Disp. Res.
Mag., Fall 1999, at 23-24. See also, Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration
and Civil Rights, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 29, 57-59 (1998).
76. Cole v. Burns Int’l Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C.Cir. 1997).
77. Hooters, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
78. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 60 Cal.Rptr. 138 (1997).
79. Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Iris Construction Corp., 168 N.E.2d 377 (1960).
80. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (1976).
81. See e.g., Raytheorn Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989)
(expressly rejects Garrity).
82. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
83. The Court quoted Restatement section 206, comment a in support of this position.
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84. Parties may expressly limit the authority of an arbitrator to award exemplary or punitive
damages, but they did not do so in the standard securities contract. [Of course, such a provision is
trumped by a statutory authorization of punitive damages, and an overbroad prohibition of punitive
damages may provide a court with the opportunity to declare the arbitration provision
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.] Some firms can and do seek to limit or prohibit
punitive damages awards, but this approach has been expressly rejected in the securities industry.
The NASD Rules prohibit member firms from including in their customer contracts and provision
that “limits the ability of the arbitrator to make any award.” NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Rule
21(f)(4).
85. Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 689 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 1997). At issue was the
NASD’s eligibility (for arbitration) rule. The court found that eligibility was to be determined by
the arbitrator not a court, a position subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court. Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
86. The quoted language (used by the court without attribution) is from Arthur Miller, Death of a
Salesman (19–).
87. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
88. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 46 Lab. Rep. 611 (1965).
89. CitiFinancial, Inc. v Brown, 2001 WL 1530352, rev’d 304 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2002).
90. See discussion in section V(C)(2).
91. My recommendations are found in part VIII.
92. There are two other instances where a single firm is involved in a hugely disproportionate
number of reported arbitration cases. In securities arbitration, the firm is Shearson; in franchise
arbitration the firm is Doctor’s Associates (DAI), the Subway Sandwich Shop franchisor. For a
collection of DAI cases, see Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, ARBITRATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 199-214 (1998) and Supplement (2002).
93. Smith v. Gateway, Inc., 2002 WL 1728615 (Tex.App.) (arbitration; subsequent award
confirmed); Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 772 N.E.2d 256 (Ill.App. 2002) (no arbitration);
Licitra v. Gateway, Inc. 189 Misc,2d 721, 734 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup.Ct. 2001) (no arbitration);
Edmond v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 2001 WL 359176 (Conn.Super.) (arbitration); Westendorf v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 2000 WL 307369 (Del.Ch.) (arbitration); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246
A.D.2d 246, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App.Div. 1998) (arbitration, but ICC provision struck); Filias v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 97C 2523 [N.D.Ill., January 15, 1998], transferred by 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7115 [E.D.Mich., Apr. 8, 1997, Zatkoff, J] (unreported decision discussed in Brower)
(AAA arbitration, Gateway did not argue for ICC provision). See also Parnes v. Gateway 2000,
Inc. 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir.)(unsuccessful securities fraud claim).
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94. A Westlaw search using the terms “Dell Computer” & “Arbitration” generated no cases. The
search terms that produced the Gateway cases were “Gateway Computer” & “Arbitration.” Some
older cases were found through “Gateway 2000" & “Arbitration.”
95. Hill, which involved the same contract terms as Brower, upheld the choice of forum on the
basis of Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
96. Smith v. Gateway, Inc., 2002 WL 1728615 (Tex.App.).
97. The provision is quoted in Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 189 Misc,2d 721, 723; 734 N.Y.S.2d 389,
391 (Sup.Ct. 2001).
98. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 637 (1996);
99. Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitrtion of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A
Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 Ohio St. J. Disp. Res. 267 (1995).
100. David Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wisc. L. Rev. 33, __.
101. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331,
333 (1997).
102. The reference is to Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M?V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528
(1995), which upheld the arbitration provisions in standardized international maritime bills of
lading in use throughout the world, and based on the Hague Rules to which the all the leading
maritime nations including the United States are parties. As for the consequences of the Sky
Reefer decision, a lawyer who specialized in litigation of cargo disputes in American courts,
identified two: lower freight rates due to a decrease in cargo claims litigation, and lower legal fees
– “most U.S. cargo plaintiff and defense lawyers will be will be looking for other employment.”
Charles M. Davis, Sky Reefer: Foreign Arbitration and Litigation Under COGSA, 8 U.S.F.
Maritime L.J. 73, 88 (1996). Arguably, these consequences should be seen as salutary
developments for both shippers and carriers, with result in lower prices for the consumers about
whom we all profess to be concerned.
103. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
Fordham L. Rev. 761 (2002).
104. The leading supporters are Christopher R. Drahozal and Stephen J. Ware, both of whom now
teach at the University of Kansas Law School. Both can be classified as being of the pro-business
“law and economics” persuasion, who like arbitration because it is a creature of contract, and
removes cases from courts and juries. Professor Ware is critical of the separability doctrine, which
favors arbitration, because it undermines the pure contract model. Indeed he writes of “the branch
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of contract law known as arbitration law ....” Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and
Voluntary Consent, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 83, 160 (1996).
105. Placement of materials is a relevant factor. The Knapp casebook takes a measured approach
to commercial arbitration, in a useful three page section on that topic – but it is found in the las
three pages of the casebook, where it is likely to be omitted or to be overlooked in the rush to
complete the course materials.
106. This was Gompers’ answer to the question: What do the unions want? Add citation.
107. FAA, sec. 2. The reference to a written contract allows the argument that the contract was
formed before the arbitration term was conveyed to the other party. Judge Easterbrook’s rolling
contract approach is more difficult to sustain for arbitration than for other purported terms of an
agreement.
108. For a complete specification of the RUAA innovations, see Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy
Trachte-Huber, Arbitration in the 1990s: The Top Ten Developments, Disp. Res. J. 24, 32-33
(Nov. 2000 – Jan. 2001).
109. Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-985 (2d Cir.
1942).
110. See e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, --- (1989);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chyrsler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, ___ (1985);
111. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 588 (2002).
112. See Willian W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort of
Kompetenz-Kompetence Has Crossed the Atlantic, 12 Arb. Int’l 137 (1996).
113. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 123 S.Ct. 588 (2002). The decision was unanimous (8-0).
Justice Thomas concurred, and O’Connor did not participate.
114. Pacificare Healthy Systems, Inc. v. Book, 123 S.Ct. 1531 (2003). The decision was
unanimous (8-0). Justice Thomas did not participate.
115. 18 U.S.C. sec. 1961 et seq.
116. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241. For an argument that
RICO claims are “not appropriate for arbitration,” see Ronald J. Offenkrantz, Arbitrating RICO:
Ten Years After McMahon, 1997 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 45, 61.
117. See Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998).
118. 123 S.Ct. at 1534.
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119. 123 S.Ct. at 1535-1536.
120. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. ___ (2003). [Green Tree now
is part of Conseco Financial Corporation.] Bazzle did not produce a majority opinion in the
Supreme Court. There is a plurality opinion for four Justices by Justice Breyer, with Justice
Stevens providing the fifth vote to produce a majority result.
121. For a critique of Bazzle, see Stephen K. Huber, Confusion About Class Arbitration, 6 J. Tex.
Consumer L. ___ (2003).
122. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
123. The Murphy casebook offers the most coverage of separability, but it does so in two different
places with two different cases, without any cross-reference between them.
124. This is a highly stylized and generalized rendition of a considerably messier set of facts.
125. FAA, section 4.
126. 388 U.S. at ___.
127. The FAA commerce language is unique: “contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce ....” FAA, sec. 2. The Court subsequently held that this language encompasses the full
extent of the commerce power. Allied-Bruce Terminex Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995).
128. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
129. The Court has repeated reiterated the broad preemptive impact of the FAA. Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Allied-Bruce Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)
(despite brief by twenty state attorneys general arguing that FAA did not apply to state court
proceedings); Green Tree Financial corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (2003) (despite brief by a large
number of law professors arguing that FAA did not apply to state court proceedings).
130. CitiFinancial v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2002).
131. Id. at 687, quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987).
132. Citation to New York case.
133. RUAA, sec. 2(b). The Commentary specifies that “section 2(b) is intended to follow the
separability doctrine outlined in Prima Paint ....”
134. W. Lawrence Craig, et. al., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ARBITRATION sec. 5.04 (1991).
135. FAA, section 10. The UAA, section 12, and the RUAA, section 19, are in accord.
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136. For a comparison of the major provisions of the English Act and the FAA, see Adam Samuel,
Arbitration Statutes in England and the USA, Arb. & Disp. Res. J. at 2 (March 1999).
137. The nature of the uniform laws process militates against taking controversial positions,
because the goal is to create a model statute that will be enacted without material changes
throughout the country.
138. LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997). This topic has
generated considerable commentary in the law reviews.
139. A person could be retained to arbitrate all the disputes between two parties. Such
arrangements are sometimes used in the labor-management arena, where the person is called an
“umpire.”
140. FAA, section 11.
141. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003).
142. A stronger party may use the attendant delay to its advantage. See e.g., Engalla v.
Permanente Medical Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997)
143. FAA, sec. 5.
144. Full disclosure: my wife was formerly a Vice-President (one of many) at the AAA.
145. The “then in force” language ensures that the dispute is governed by the AAA Rules at the
time the dispute arises, rather than those in use when the parties made their contract.
146. See e.g., Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 846 (1961); Lisa
Bernstein Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992).
147. See William Dodge, Why Contracts Teachers Fail to Teach the CISG, ___ J. Legal Ed. ___
(20__).
148. 21 U.S.T. 2517 (1970). See generally, Albert Jan van der Berg, THE NEW YORK
ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981).
149. See generally, Howard M. Holtzmann & Joseph E. Neuhaus, A GUIDE TO THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY (1989).
150. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Prima Paint is discussed in section
VIII(B)(2).
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151. Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). The FAA applies to any
contract “evidencing a transaction involving language.” Section 2. This language is unique to the
FAA, leaving room for the argument about its meaning.
152. Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). This time Justice O’Connor
concurred, even though she continued to believe that her Southland dissent was correct, based on
considerations of stare decisis. She concluded that Southland had not proven to be unworkable,
and of course Congress is free to amend the FAA. Accordingly, the proper forum for considering
preemption arguments is Congress not the courts.
153. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (2003). For the professors brief, see
2003 WL --------.
154. Arbitration is “outcome determinative,” see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945),
and therefore “substantive” for Erie purposes. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of American, 350
U.S. 198 (1956).
155. Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
156. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 2307 (2003).
157. 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994)
158. For afficionados of such literature, the closest analogy is found in some of the opinions of
former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Michael Musmanno.
159. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
160. “In Southland we held”; “In Perry we reiterated”; “In Allied-Bruce we restated”; “Repeating
our observation in Perry”; “What states may not do”; “By enacting section 2, we have several
times said”; “Courts may not”; “Montana’s statute directly conflicts”; “It bears reiteration”; and
“this Court’s precedents indicate.”
161. 54 P.3d 1 (2002), cert. Denied, 123 S.Ct. 1633 (2003). See Carroll E. Neesmann, Montana
Court Continues Its Hostility to Mandatory Arbitration, ABA Disp. Res. J. 22 (Feb./April 2003).
162. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
163. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (1934 Act, RICO);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) [Wilko reversed
and disavowed].
164. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
165. This topic is discussed at length in section V(C).
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166. Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 1064 (Cal. 2003).
167. Hooters, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
168. Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872 (N.J. 2002).
169. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int’l, Inc. 598 F.Supp. 353 (N.D.Ala. 1984).
A reasonable student might conclude – incorrectly in this instance – that between the highest New
York court and a trial court in Alabama, the former is the better authority.
170. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992). This excellent article nicely illustrates how the
“law” applied by a trade association can differ from the law of the land.
171. Matter of Sprinzen, 389 N.E.2d 974 (N.Y. 1979).
172. Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
173. Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 749 A.2d 405 (N.J.Super. 2000).
174. Recently the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a decision upholding an employee arbitration
agreement, cited Quigley for the proposition that “in New Jersey, continued employment has been
found to constitute sufficient consideration to support certain employment-related agreements.”
Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872 (N.J. 2002). This 4-3 decision, with a strong dissent,
would make a better teaching tool for those who want to explore arbitration in the employment
context.
175. 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996).
176. This circumstance provided a severe temptation to award less than five points here (which I
resisted), and illustrates that an apparently objective point system provides only an approximation
of reality.
177. Berendt, et. al., discussed above.
178. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
179. Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992). The court
declined to enforce the arbitration provision there was no need to discuss any arbitration issues.
180. Restatement 2d, sec. 261, illustrations 2 and 3.
181. Hooters, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th cir. 1999).
182. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. 70 F.Supp.2d 815 (S.D.Ohio 1999).
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183. The items not listed include Itoh, a main case (210); note coverage of Hill (221); note
coverage of Brower (222); and a summary of Klocek (222).
184. Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
185. In re Arbitration Between Acadia Company & Irving Edlitz, 165 N.E.2d 411 (N.Y. 1960).
186. The case of Wasserman’s Inc. v. Township of Middletown, 645 A.2d 100 (N.J. 1994)
187. See particularly, Lon Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wisc. L. Rev. 3.
188. See Steven J. Burton & Melvin A. Eisenberg, CONTRACT LAW: SELECTED SOURCE
MATERIALS 562-601 (2003). Earlier editions of the Supplement made use of the same four
contracts.
189. John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau & Edward P. Sherman, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS (2d ed. 1996).
190. Russell J. Weintraub, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION:
PRACTICE AND PLANNING (2d ed. 1997).
191. Aimcee Wholesale, 237 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1968).
192. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Gilmer v.
Intrerstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Nghiem v. NEC Electronics, Inc., 25 F.3d
1437 (9th Cir. 1994); San Juan v. American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247
(7th Cir. 1995); Kotam Electronics, Inc. v. JBL Consumer Products, Inc. 93 F.3d 724 (11th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
193. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express Inc., v, McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
194. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
Fordham L. Rev. 761 (2002), discussed at fn. .
195. As commonly happens with casebooks revisions, the authors divide up the material with each
taking primary responsibility for different parts. Still, this is a mater, for better and for worse, of
joint and several responsibility.
196. Rollins, Inc. v . Foster, 991 F.Supp. 1426 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
197. Cooper v. MRM Investment Co., 199 F.Supp.2d 771 (M.D.Tenn. 2002); Adkins v. Labor
Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2002).
198. Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872 (N.J. 2002).
199. Id. at 888.
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200. In re Halliburton, 80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002). I regularly tell my students not to assume
that the law of Texas is the same as that in California.
201. Richard Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call For
Reforem, 38 Hous. L. Rev. 1237 (2001).
202. See Marc Galanter, Why The Haves Come Out Ahead: Reflections on the Limitations of
Judicial Law Reform, __ Law & Soc’y Rev. ___ (19 ).
203. Macauley comes in two forms: the two volume soft cover version discussed here, and a one
volume hard cover version that is titled CONTRACTS IN ACTION: THE CONCISE COURSE
(2003). The later is 1,100+ pages in length, with the reduction in pages achieved largely by
reduced textual material. [The hard cover book does not explain how the two differ; an item-byitem comparison of the arbitration materials in the two versions of Macauley would involve more
detail than is likely to interest even the most dedicated readers.]
204. I approve of this approach. See E. Wendy Trachte-Huber & Stephen K. Huber,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BUSINESS (1996),
which weighs in at about 1,400 pages.
205. Fabyanske and Halverson, Arbitration: Is it an Acceptable Method of Resolving Construction
and Contract Disputes?, 16 The Forum 281 (1980) (publication of the ABA section of Insurance,
Negligence and Compensation Law).
206. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
207.

Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 689 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 1997).

208. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
209. Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 76 Cal.App.4th 1229, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 916 (1999).
210. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wisc. L. Rev. 33.
211. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002), on remand after the court’s
initial decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001).
212. Macneil states that he “played only a very modest reviewing role in this revision.” (xii)
213. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
Warrior & Gulf is one of the “Steelworkers Trilogy,” three cases involving the United
Steelworkers decided by the Court on the same day with opinions by Justice Douglas, and
appearing in consecutive pages of the United States Reports.
214. Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989)
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215. Advanced Micro Devices v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1994).
216. Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1992),
217. Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assoc., Inc., 640 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1994). Macneil notes
this fact, but uses Perini instead of Tretina anyway.
218. Broemmer v. Abortion Services Of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Merit Insurance Co. v.
Leatherby Insurance Co., 714 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1983).
219. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 838 (1995).
220. Volt Information Services, Inc. V. Stanford University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681 (1996).
221. Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need For Restraint and Consistencey, 46
Hastings L.J. 459, 502-512 (1995).
222. Ian R. Macneil, Ricard E. Speidel & Thomas Stipanowich, FEDERAL ARBITRATION
LAW (1994).
223. Much of the material was drawn from Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights
Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The case for Reform, 4 Ohio St. Disp. Res. J. 157 (1989).
224. Textile Unlimited, Inc. v. A .. BMH and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2002).
225. Roe v. Gray, 165 F.Supp.2d 1164 (D.Col. 2001).
226. Deer Stags, Inc. v. Garrison Industries, 2000 WL 1800491 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
227. Specht v. Nescape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). Specht consumes 9+
casebook pages, as much as the three previously discussed arbitration cases.
228. CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Brown, 2001 WL 1530352 (N.D.Miss.), rev’d sub. nom. Primerica Life
Insurance Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2002)
229. See Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 2000).
230. Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F.Supp.2d 745 (2001). The RUAA and ICANN provisions
are compared in Richard E. Speidel, ICANN Domain Name Dispute Resolution, The Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Limitations of Modern Arbitration Law, 6 J. Small & Emerg.
Bus. L. 167 (2002).
231. Since I regard the separability doctrine as the most important single matter for a contracts
student to know about, there are many worse sins of omission and commission in contracts
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casebooks, but as one who has to cover contracts in a four-credit, first semester course, duplication
is an unaffordable luxury.
232. Michael-Curry Co. v. Knutson Shareholders, 449 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1989)
233. Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. 334, 350 (1972), quoted with approval in MichaelCurry.
234. Brook v. Peak Int’l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 2002) (1069).
235. In an error, the book states that the 5th circuit takes a contrary position, followed by a citation
to Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001). The 5th circuit was the first to
recognize expanded judicial review by contract. Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-997 (5th Cir. 1995).
236. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-985.
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often a way of life, and not just something one does upon the sale of a residence. [Quarterly
treatment is recommended in the greater Houston area.]
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